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JUDICIARY RISING: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Erin F. Delaney 
ABSTRACT—Britain is experiencing a period of dramatic change that 
challenges centuries-old understandings of British constitutionalism. In the 
past fifteen years, the British Parliament enacted a quasi-constitutional bill 
of rights; devolved legislative power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland; and created a new Supreme Court. British academics debate how 
each element of this transformation can be best understood: is it consistent 
with political constitutionalism and historic notions of parliamentary 
sovereignty, or does it usher in a new regime that places external, rule-of-
law-based limits on Parliament? Much of this commentary examines these 
changes in a piecemeal fashion, failing to account for the systemic factors 
at play in the British system. 
This Article assesses the cumulative force of the many recent 
constitutional changes, shedding new light on the changing nature of the 
British constitution. Drawing on the U.S. literature on federalism and 
judicial power, the Article illuminates the role of human rights and 
devolution in the growing influence of the U.K. Supreme Court. Whether a 
rising judiciary will truly challenge British notions of parliamentary 
sovereignty is as yet unknown, but scholars and politicians should pay 
close attention to the groundwork being laid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For those interested in studying constitutional design and 
constitutionalism, the twenty-first century has presented ample 
opportunity—from constitution building in Iraq and Afghanistan to the 
Arab Spring and related change in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and other states. 
These new constitutional processes and regimes demand attention; they 
present the possibility of far-reaching democratic expansion in the midst of 
often violent power struggles. But dramatic constitutional change can also 
occur in a more orderly fashion and within established democracies. In this 
set, no country has seen more striking shifts in its constitutional design than 
the United Kingdom. 
Staid, comfortable old Britain—with its own Glorious Revolution well 
in the past and a history of rights protection “from time immemorial”1—is 
having a constitutional renaissance.2 In the past fifteen years, the British 
Parliament enacted a quasi-constitutional bill of rights; devolved legislative 
power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland; and created a new 
Supreme Court. As Anthony King, a professor of British government, has 
remarked, “Although few people seem to have noticed the fact, the truth is 
that the United Kingdom’s constitution changed more between 1970 and 
2000, and especially between 1997 and 2000, than during any comparable 
 
1 1297—or even 1215—is not quite “from time immemorial,” but it is close. See MAGNA CARTA 
(1297). On the Glorious Revolution, see EDWARD VALLANCE, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 1688: 
BRITAIN’S FIGHT FOR LIBERTY (2006). 
2 ROGER MASTERMAN, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION 245 
(2011) (“The effects of the constitutional reforms that have been implemented since the first Blair 
administration came to power in May 1997 are nothing short of spectacular, given the generally 
incremental development of the UK constitution.”). 
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period since at least the middle of the 18th century.”3 Subsequent authors 
identify the critical years as those from 1997 to 2005: the heart of the Blair 
government’s efforts to “modernize” the country and the constitution.4 
American attention has not been focused on these events; indeed, 
many are unaware of the extent or nature of recent constitutional change in 
the United Kingdom.5 But scholars in Britain have debated the meaning of 
these reforms and their effects on the way British constitutionalism is 
conceptualized and articulated.6 Two competing normative and descriptive 
theories structure these constitutional debates: political constitutionalism 
and legal constitutionalism. Political constitutionalism finds its support in 
representative democracy and republicanism and gives rise to institutional 
fidelity to Parliament and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Legal 
constitutionalism, in contrast, identifies the primacy of rights protection 
and the dangers of excessive democracy; legal constitutionalists maintain 
that external limitations must exist on Parliament, and, generally speaking, 
they focus their attention on the role of courts and judicial review. In the 
literature, most reforms are assessed by their perceived connections to 
either a broader political or legal constitutionalist framework. 
This scholarly agenda has developed in an ad hoc fashion, due in large 
part to the fact that the various reforms themselves “have been legislated 
piecemeal, and . . . seem without internal coherence. They have been 
regarded, therefore, as a disparate collection of unrelated measures rather 
than as a package.”7 Some initial efforts have been made to view these 
changes in light of their combined effect on the constitutional system.8 But, 
as Richard Bellamy, a leading political constitutionalist, wrote in 2011, “no 
 
3 ANTHONY KING, DOES THE UNITED KINGDOM STILL HAVE A CONSTITUTION? 53 (2001). 
4 Tony Blair led the Labour Party to victory in 1997, 2001, and 2005, and served as Prime Minister 
from 1997 until June 2007. Authors recognizing constitutional change include Nicholas Bamforth, 
Current Issues in United Kingdom Constitutionalism: An Introduction, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 79, 79 
(2011), who describes 1997 to 2005 as a period of “sustained and deep-level constitutional change,” and 
Robert Hazell, Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State Survive?, 1999 P.L. 84, 85, who claims the 
eleven constitutional bills proposed in the opening session of Parliament in 1997 “to be a parliamentary 
record. For once it wasn’t hyperbole when the Scottish White Paper described these as ‘the most 
ambitious and far reaching changes in the British constitution undertaken by any government this 
century.’” 
5 Attention in U.S. law reviews has been limited. See, e.g., Peter L. Fitzgerald, Constitutional Crisis 
over the Proposed Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 233 (2004); 
JoAnne Sweeny, Creating a More Dangerous Branch: How the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 
Has Empowered the Judiciary and Changed the Way the British Government Creates Law, 21 MICH. 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 301 (2013); JoAnne Sweeny, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act: Using Its 
Past to Predict Its Future, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 39 (2010). 
6 The International Journal of Constitutional Law featured a series of articles by key British 
authors in this debate in a 2011 Symposium. See Symposium, The Changing Landscape of British 
Constitutionalism, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 79–273 (2011). 
7 VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 271 (2009). 
8 See, e.g., id. 
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scholar has adequately assessed all [the significant changes] and the 
interesting and complex ways they interrelate.”9 
Beyond introducing the changing British constitutional system to an 
American audience, this Article seeks to fill the gap in the existing British 
literature by presenting the current round of constitutional reforms as 
interconnected elements within a system of multilevel governance.10 In so 
doing, it will provide a richer descriptive analysis of the British 
constitutional system and will highlight the potential for further change. In 
his recent book, The New British Constitution, Vernon Bogdanor claims 
that Britain is “in transition from a system based on parliamentary 
sovereignty to one based on the sovereignty of a constitution.”11 In other 
words, he suggests that Britain is changing from a system of pure 
parliamentary power to one in which there are external limits to 
parliamentary action—meaningful, legal limits, as would exist in a 
constitution interpreted and upheld by a court. By considering the ways in 
which newly created institutional relationships have affected the role of the 
judiciary, this Article provides evidence to support Bogdanor’s assertion. In 
addition, evidence of relationships and networks that support judicial 
power—and in particular, the power of the U.K. Supreme Court—will 
affect the debate between the political and legal constitutionalists. To the 
extent that the judiciary’s fortunes may be rising, the legal constitutionalists 
gain fodder for their arguments about the nature of British constitutional 
reform—that it is shifting to a system marked by external limitations on 
Parliament capable of being enforced by the judiciary. (And political 
constitutionalists would do well to take note.) 
In order to investigate these relationships in the United Kingdom, this 
Article will draw on the rich literature developed to explain the rise and 
maintenance of judicial power in the United States. American legal 
academics and political scientists have long attempted to understand how 
and in what ways the U.S. Supreme Court grew in power and authority 
over the centuries since its birth. They have identified explanatory 
factors—varying in persuasiveness—to explain the rise of judicial review 
and the phenomenon of judicial supremacy, including the role of multilevel 
governance structures.12 In the United States, “th[e] transformation of the 
 
9 See Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
86, 87 n.5 (2011). 
10 An earlier effort described the results of constitutional change as creating a multilayered 
constitutional system. See generally PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-LAYERED CONSTITUTION (Nicholas 
Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., 2003). 
11 BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at xiii. 
12 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007); 
Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial 
Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1166–72 (2011); Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and 
American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73, 114 (2000); Mark A. Graber, The 
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institutional judiciary did not occur without controversy, without 
contestation, or without compromise,”13 and merely because circumstances 
may suggest the rise of judicial power does not mean that the judiciary in 
Britain will develop in the same way as its American counterpart. 
Nevertheless, by drawing on this scholarship, this Article argues that 
similar conditions for increased judicial power do exist in Britain such that, 
over time,14 the U.K. Supreme Court could gain sufficient institutional 
strength to enforce some limits on Parliament. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief description 
of the broader constitutional debate in Britain, outlining the opposing 
viewpoints of the political and legal constitutionalists and their respective 
institutional connections with Parliament and the judiciary. Part II 
describes three dramatic reforms to Britain’s political and legal structure: 
the Human Rights Act (1998), which provided a catalogue of judicially 
enforceable rights; the Devolutionary Acts (1998 et seq.), which created 
and empowered subnational legislatures in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and 
Wales; and the Constitutional Reform Act (2005), which removed the 
United Kingdom’s highest court from the House of Lords and created a 
new United Kingdom Supreme Court.15 Part III then presents a series of 
expectations, drawn from political science literature on federalism and 
comparative scholarship on courts, about how the interactions between and 
among the Human Rights Act, devolution, and the new Supreme Court 
could serve to empower the British judiciary. In certain cases, the expected 
behavior is observable; in others, differences in political structures and the 
cultural context suggest other results. Nevertheless, at a general level, Part 
 
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993) 
[hereinafter Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty]; J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence 
of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); James R. Rogers, Information and 
Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative–Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84 (2001); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent 
Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003). 
13 JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY 14 (2012). 
14 See id. at 7 (“[A]ny view of the judiciary as simply a constitutional abstraction that does not 
itself develop over time is misguided.”); see also Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the 
Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 511, 511 n.1 (2002) (noting the “questionable assumption[] . . . that the nature and scope of 
judicial power are a preconstitutional decision rather than a by-product of ongoing political 
construction”). 
15 This Article does not address the relationship between Britain and the European Union. The role 
of the European Communities Act (1972) in raising the profile and power of the judiciary is an oft-
discussed challenge to parliamentary sovereignty. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WICKS, THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTION: EIGHT KEY MOMENTS IN BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 137–65 (2006); N.W. 
Barber, The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 144, 149–51 (2011); Adam 
Tucker, Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
31 O.J.L.S. 61, 72–77 (2011). To the extent that the multilevel dynamic between the U.K. and the EU 
presents opportunities for enhanced judicial power, these possibilities will be noted. See infra notes 182 
and 309. 
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III concludes that these interactions demonstrate an increased, and 
increasing, power of the judiciary, thus lending support to those who claim 
a constitutional shift is occurring. 
I. THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION: CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Partially written in various Acts and statutes,16 partially constructed 
out of conventions, practices, and understandings—the British constitution 
defies easy identification.17 It is therefore unsurprising that British 
constitutionalism, or the “normative creed” of the constitution,18 is likewise 
difficult to define. Two competing theories vie to provide the overarching 
conception of constitutionalism: “political constitutionalism” and “legal 
constitutionalism.” These theories proceed along terms both normative—
how should the constitutional system be understood—and descriptive—
how can the constitutional system be understood.19 
In very broad terms, theories of political and legal constitutionalism 
are often thought to match the British and American systems of 
government: a supreme parliament in Britain and a supreme court in 
America.20 Of course, this distinction blurs in the details. As Richard 
Bellamy, the leading political constitutionalist in Britain, acknowledges, 
“[t]here has always been a legal constitutionalist strand within British 
constitutional culture, and historians have long stressed the republican and 
political thread running through the American . . . constitutional 
tradition.”21 Nevertheless, the analogy reflects a core difference between 
the approaches: the institution or institutions entrusted with the 
responsibility for ensuring both accountability and governmental (and 
possibly societal) fidelity to the constitutional order.22 
 
16 See John Gardner, Can There Be a Written Constitution? 3 (Oxford Legal Studies, Research 
Paper No. 17/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401244 (citing “Magna Carta 1297, 
the Laws in Wales Acts 1535–1542, the Habeas Corpus Act 1679, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of 
Union (with Scotland) 1707, the Act of Union (with Ireland) 1800, the Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875, 
and the Statute of Westminster 1931” as canonical texts, among other “[m]ore debatable” examples 
listed afterwards). 
17 JAMES MITCHELL, DEVOLUTION IN THE UK 1 (2009) (describing the nation’s “constitutional 
illiteracy” as stemming from the fact “that there is no agreement on what constitutes the UK 
constitution”). 
18 Walter F. Murphy, Designing a Constitution: Of Architects and Builders, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 
1309 (2009). 
19 See Adam Tomkins, What’s Left of the Political Constitution?, 14 GERMAN L.J. 2275, 2275 
(2013) (describing the relationship between political and legal constitutionalism as “one of rivalry”). 
20 See RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 10 (2007); see also id. 
(“[P]arliamentary sovereignty and the Westminster model . . . has frequently provided the model for 
political constitutionalists.”). 
21 Id. (citing to popular constitutionalist writing in the United States). 
22 See Paul P. Craig, Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 19, 32 (Christopher Forsyth et al. eds., 2010) (noting political constitutionalists emphasize 
“non-judicial mechanisms for securing accountability”). 
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The normative debate will be familiar to an American audience: Legal 
constitutionalists maintain that constitutional goods are best guaranteed 
through the articulation of rights-protecting fundamental law, a law that 
stands superior to and apart from daily political machinations and to which 
all governmental institutions are bound, primarily through the mechanism 
of judicial review. In contrast, political constitutionalists argue that resting 
ultimate authority in a democratic parliament better achieves the 
“constitutional goods of rights and the rule of law,”23 by protecting values 
of democracy and republican nondomination. Given the dramatic influence 
of theories of fundamental rights and the rise of court-centered 
constitutional systems over the past fifty years, in a global context the 
political constitutionalists are outnumbered. In the United Kingdom, 
however, they have a more persuasive case, resting on the descriptive 
prong of their analysis. 
Constitutionalism in the absence of a codified constitution derives in 
large part from the practices of the political system.24 Thus, describing 
those practices is particularly important: demonstrating, for example, that 
the British system has always had elements that promote or reflect a 
particular set of constitutionalist aims makes it easier to advocate for 
further reform in that vein. The political constitutionalists are better 
situated in this context because, in the British political system, sovereignty 
has been long understood to rest in Parliament25—a functional application 
of the normative principles of political constitutionalism. In contrast, the 
legal constitutionalist model relies on “the assumption that courts are 
important for legal accountability,”26 and legal constitutionalists struggle to 
provide conclusive evidence that meaningful judicial review is and has 
been an essential element of British constitutionalism.27 
This Part will provide a brief overview of each theory of 
constitutionalism and how it connects to various aspects of British political 
culture and organization. The theories are necessarily presented in broad 
terms; these are contested concepts themselves, with many nuances and 
distinctions in their normative justifications. In order to provide some 
practical purchase on these ideas, this Part will also discuss the institutions 
with which each theory is most closely connected: political 
constitutionalism with Parliament, legal constitutionalism with the 
judiciary. As with the theories themselves, these institutional linkages are 
 
23 BELLAMY, supra note 20, at 12. 
24 Id. 
25 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37–41 (7th ed. 
1908). 
26 Craig, supra note 22, at 58. 
27 In the British context, “judicial review,” akin to administrative review in the United States, is 
limited to review of executive action and secondary legislation. For a discussion of judicial review, see 
PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4–7 (6th ed. 2008), and Paul Craig, Ultra Vires and the 
Foundations of Judicial Review, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 63, 64–66 (1998). 
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of primary importance at a general level; this focus is not intended to deny 
the potential relevance of courts to political constitutionalists, or of 
Parliament to legal constitutionalists.28 
A. Political Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Sovereignty 
To understand political constitutionalism as a working theory of 
constitutional order, it is first necessary to explain and discuss the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty and its development as the “dominant 
characteristic” of the British political system.29 The evolution of Parliament 
as a representative forum presents a complicated and detailed history, but a 
few aspects of its progression serve to highlight its critical constitutional 
role. Parliamentary power accrued slowly, over time, by a corresponding 
decline or diminution of the power of the throne.30 Parliamentary authority 
thus derived from the institution’s ancient connection to the monarchy, 
rather than due to the actions of a constituent power resting in “the 
people.”31 In the United States, popular sovereignty provides a theoretical 
justification for setting limits on legislative action; the people act as the 
principal, the legislature as their agent. But parliamentary sovereignty has 
been described as an “obfuscation,” something like a sleight of hand, 
allowing Parliament’s representative function to stand in for popular 
sovereignty.32 Thus, there is no clear basis for external limitations on 
parliamentary power.33 
The modern conception of parliamentary sovereignty was articulated 
in 1885, when Albert Venn Dicey, a Professor at All Souls College, 
 
28 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 16, at 7 (“My emphasis on the courts does not prevent me from 
endorsing Bellamy’s [a political constitutionalist’s] view of the constitution.”). 
29 DICEY, supra note 25, at 37. 
30 See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1957); CONRAD RUSSELL, KING 
JAMES VI AND I AND HIS ENGLISH PARLIAMENTS (Richard Cust & Andrew Thrush eds., 2011). Thus 
(and notwithstanding the modern focus on the popularly elected House of Commons), the legislative 
power does not reside in the House of Commons alone, but in the Queen, the House of Lords, and the 
Commons. Together they act as “the crown-in-parliament.” See Martin Loughlin, Constituent Power 
Subverted: From English Constitutional Argument to British Constitutional Practice, in THE PARADOX 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 27, 43 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007). 
31 The idea of popular sovereignty was “suppress[ed]” after the failure of the Commonwealth of 
England (1649 to 1660), and after the restoration of the monarchy, parliamentary authority was justified 
through the reinvocation of the divine right of the king. Loughlin, supra note 30, at 28. Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy describes parliamentary sovereignty as a doctrine developed in the late seventeenth 
century. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 18–
47 (2010). 
32 Loughlin, supra note 30, at 28, 42. 
33 Certain legal constitutionalists suggest judicial power can be grounded on a separate 
understanding of sovereignty. See T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE 13–21 (2001) (discussing 
various interpretations of Dicey and promoting the understanding of the British constitution as 
providing dual sovereignty—of Parliament and of the courts). 
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Oxford, wrote an Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. 
The Diceyan explanation has held sway for over 100 years, and his 
exegesis has “almost served as a surrogate written constitution,” making 
sense of the myriad conventions and other unarticulated norms that 
structure the British system of government.34 Dicey’s definition of 
Parliament’s power is succinct: “[T]he right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of 
England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.”35 
This definition of parliamentary sovereignty encompasses three 
important ideas. First, there is no entrenchment of fundamental or 
“constitutional” laws. In other words, to the extent that there may be some 
distinction between fundamental and ordinary law (a contention Dicey 
denies36), fundamental law does not achieve its importance by means of its 
creation or implementation but by political convention.37 Second, 
Parliament is supreme. No other institution “can pronounce void any 
enactment passed by the British Parliament on the ground of such 
enactment being opposed to the constitution.”38 And third, and perhaps 
more obliquely, even Parliament cannot bind itself. No Parliament can bind 
successor Parliaments.39 
Under this definition of parliamentary power, therefore, the unwritten 
constitution does not provide any sort of legal limitations on Parliament. 
The constitution “lives on, changing from day to day for the constitution is 
no more and no less than what happens. Everything that happens is 
constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be constitutional 
also.”40 Dicey did not deny that there were practical limitations on the 
 
34 THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION v (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 6th ed. 2007). 
35 DICEY, supra note 25, at 38. 
36 Dicey claims that “[t]here is under the English constitution no marked or clear distinction 
between laws which are not fundamental or constitutional and laws which are fundamental or 
constitutional.” Id. at 85. This statement is under some pressure from the courts and politicians, as 
doctrines and conventions emerge requiring clear statement rules from Parliament about the alteration 
of certain statutes. See infra Part II.A. 
37 In other words, there are no voting requirements (supermajoritarian or otherwise) to designate 
“constitutional” legislation. “[F]undamental . . . laws are . . . changed by the same body and in the same 
manner as other laws, namely, by Parliament acting in its ordinary legislative character.” DICEY, supra 
note 25, at 84. But see SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE, 2010–12, H.L. 177 (U.K.) (suggesting the creation of procedural mechanisms to indicate the 
constitutional importance of proposed legislation). 
38 DICEY, supra note 25, at 87. 
39 Id. at 84. 
40 J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 M.L.R. 1, 19 (1979). 
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power of Parliament: certainly political limitations exist.41 As Lord Reid 
opined in 1969: 
 It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom 
Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other 
reasons against doing them are so strong that most people would regard it as 
highly improper if Parliament did these things. But that does not mean that it 
is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do 
any of them the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid.42 
This conventional account of the British constitution makes little provision 
for a meaningful judicial role.43 
After a century of change and constitutional experience, scholars 
debate whether the three elements of Dicey’s definition of parliamentary 
sovereignty are still valid.44 This descriptive analysis will be discussed in 
Part II. In tandem, scholars also ask whether they should hold true. Political 
constitutionalists, who defend robust parliamentary sovereignty, respond by 
drawing on theories of democracy, republicanism, and pragmatism.45 
In his detailed explication of political constitutionalism, Richard 
Bellamy offers a comprehensive justification for preferring parliamentary 
sovereignty to constitutional supremacy through judicial review.46 He 
makes two claims, one empirical and one normative: he argues first that 
there is reasonable disagreement about substantive outcomes that society 
should achieve, and then concludes “the democratic process is more 
 
41 Dicey discussed these in terms of external limitations, such as the threat of revolution, and 
internal limitations, arising from the nature of the sovereign power itself as the “product of a certain 
social condition.” DICEY, supra note 25, at 79. 
42 Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A.C. 645, 723 (P.C.) (appeal taken from S. 
Rhodesia). 
43 Courts necessarily have some role to play: “As the doctrine is applied today, the courts determine 
the legal effect of Acts of Parliament but Parliament may always relegislate to overrule the courts, 
subject again to the courts’ determining the legal effects of the relegislation. Parliament can always get 
its way in the end by progressively more definite reiteration. Unless Parliament tires of the process, the 
courts only get to postpone their own defeat.” Gardner, supra note 16, at 8. 
44 See, e.g., ALISON L YOUNG, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 68–
72 (2009) (justifying Parliament’s actions creating “manner and form requirements” which mark validly 
enacted legislation and serve to bind successive Parliaments, as still within a conception of the Diceyan 
constitution, under the theory of “continuing parliamentary legislative supremacy”). 
45 See BELLAMY, supra note 20 (democracy); ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 
(2005) (republicanism); Craig, supra note 22, at 27–32 (discussing pragmatic political constitutionalists 
who focus on questions of institutional competence and who argue that a legislature is better suited to 
address the “circumstances of politics” given its ability (relative to courts and judicial review) to 
provide comprehensive analysis of a given issue, to accommodate polycentric disputes, and to allow for 
debate on fundamental values). 
46 See BELLAMY, supra note 20. His insights build on work by J.A.G. Griffith, whose assessment 
of society led to his conclusion that law can only be a means of postponing, or “temporarily 
resolv[ing]” societal conflict, and as such, is itself political, Griffith, supra note 40, at 16, 20, and 
Jeremy Waldron’s critique of strong-form judicial review, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
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legitimate and effective than the judicial process at resolving these 
disagreements.”47 In his view, the constitution should not be a repository of 
substantive societal commitments but a “structure for reaching collective 
decisions about social arrangements in a democratic way.”48 Bellamy 
argues that political institutions—including party membership, equal voting 
power, and majority rule—can better reflect core republican values, such as 
nondomination and political equality, thus avoiding the potential 
oppression/domination of the constitution (as outside of politics) and the 
antimajoritarian nature of the courts.49 
B. Legal Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 
In contrast to political constitutionalists, who accept only political 
limitations on Parliament, legal constitutionalists seek to identify judicially 
enforceable, external substantive limits on Parliament, grounded in the 
common law or in principles inherent in the rule of law. Their underlying 
normative arguments reflect concerns about the excesses of democracy, 
thus seeking to protect human rights through constitutional entrenchment 
and to prevent a tyranny of the majority through countermajoritarian courts. 
Those theorists who consider themselves “moderate” legal 
constitutionalists would forswear any exclusivity arguments: the common 
law may be the “primary repository of fundamental values of the political 
community,” but it is not the only place to look.50 They acknowledge that 
there are ways to promote accountability, “independently of judicial 
review,”51 but maintain that courts may be essential for legal 
accountability. 
The challenge for British legal constitutionalists is not in providing a 
counterargument to the normative position taken by the political 
constitutionalists—in much of the constitutional world, the safeguarding of 
fundamental rights is seen as in tension with representative democracy but 
is nevertheless considered a defensible good.52 Rather, it is in offering 
convincing evidence that the common law, or principles inherent in the rule 
of law, actually exerts any limiting effect on Parliament through the courts. 
The challenge has been to demonstrate that legal constitutionalism plays a 
role in lived British constitutional experience, and thus to gain support for 
 
47 BELLAMY, supra note 20, at 4. 
48 Id. (emphasis added). 
49 See id. at 147–75. 
50 Craig, supra note 22, at 56. 
51 Id. at 58. 
52 See Murphy, supra note 18, at 1309–10 (describing the tension between substantive 
constitutional limitations and representative democracy, “whose underlying norm of popular 
sovereignty is hostile to substantive limitations on the people’s freely chosen representatives”). 
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the argument that it should continue to do so in a more robust fashion.53 
The legal constitutionalists’ attention has therefore focused on the 
expansion of administrative judicial review in Britain, the justifications for 
such review, and the manner in which the courts conduct the review. 
Robert Stevens has described mid-twentieth-century Britain as 
marking “the depths of the irrelevance of the courts in the development of 
the constitution,”54 but the rise of judicial review of executive action in the 
latter half of the century introduced public law into the mainstream.55 By 
1988, the British Civil Service was warning officials to bear in mind the 
possibility of judicial review when preparing secondary legislation;56 the 
pamphlet was entitled The Judge over Your Shoulder.57 Courts inquired 
whether action by government officials, or the content of secondary 
legislation, was ultra vires—or “beyond power.” As Paul Craig has 
explained, the phrase “does not, in and of itself, tell us whether an act is 
beyond power because the legislature has intended to place certain limits 
on an agency, or whether these limits are more properly regarded as a 
common law creation of the courts.”58 
As there is uncertainty in the justification for ultra vires judicial review 
of secondary legislative and executive action, its existence alone fails to 
conclusively demonstrate the functional application of “legal 
constitutionalism.” For example, some argue, in political constitutionalist 
terms, that the only justification for the ultra vires doctrine is parliamentary 
intent: Parliament provides a set of boundaries beyond which its agents 
may not venture, and in maintaining these limits courts are effectuating the 
purposes and intent of Parliament.59 If this connection is relinquished, “it 
 
53 T.R.S. Allan takes this argument the furthest, by arguing that the British constitution (in part due 
to its insistence on an independent judiciary) provides for the dual sovereignty of Parliament and the 
courts. See ALLAN, supra note 33, at 13. 
54 Robert Stevens, Government and the Judiciary, in THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 333, 346 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 2003). The influence of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty “implied that there should be no serious questioning not only of Acts of 
Parliament, but of administrative decisions.” This meant that “judicial work focused overwhelmingly on 
private law: public law by contrast was moribund, a wasteland.” Danny Nicol, Law and Politics After 
the Human Rights Act, 2006 P.L. 722, 724. 
55 See Nicol, supra note 54, at 724 (“In the last 50 years, . . . judges [in Britain] belatedly roused 
themselves from their post-Second World War stupor and sought to impose order on a burgeoning 
regulatory state . . . .”). 
56 Secondary legislation is roughly equivalent to administrative regulations (or general executive 
rulemaking) in the United States; secondary legislation must be expressly authorized by primary 
legislation. Thus, primary legislation would be equivalent to congressional or legislative statutes. Cf. 
P.P. CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 10–11 (1990) (discussing differences between public law in the United States and U.K.). 
57 TREASURY SOLICITOR’S DEP’T & CABINET OFFICE MGMT. & PERS. OFFICE, THE JUDGE OVER 
YOUR SHOULDER (1987). 
58 Paul Craig, Competing Models of Judicial Review, 1999 P.L. 428, 428. 
59 Craig identifies two possible versions of the ultra vires mode: specific versus general legislative 
intent. Specific intent suggests that Parliament has provided substantive rules of judicial review—this is 
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sweeps away the constitutional theory of sovereignty on which the ultra 
vires doctrine is based.”60 In contrast, other scholars have argued that case 
law demonstrates courts do not rely on parliamentary intent as the 
touchstone for judicial review, and that courts “will continue to apply their 
judicially developed tools even where there is an express or unequivocal 
Parliamentary intention to the contrary.”61 Therefore, it must be the 
common law that provides the substantive justification for judicial review.62 
Some legal constitutionalists, such as Trevor Allan, take the 
relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the common law a step 
further, seeking to demonstrate how the two concepts are intertwined. 
Allan explains: 
[T]he scope and effect of the doctrine [of parliamentary sovereignty] depend 
on persuasive analysis of the common law, sensitive to its constitutional role 
in reflecting and preserving the rule of law. If there are inherent limits to what 
can properly count as ‘law’, according to a proper understanding of the rule of 
law, there are limits to legislative supremacy that can be enforced at common 
law.63 
In other words, if parliamentary sovereignty is, in fact, a common law 
doctrine, it is the common law that may regulate and limit its breadth. 
 
 * * * 
 
The debate between political and legal constitutionalists is about 
representative democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law—and about 
the best mechanisms to achieve these often conflicting conceptions of the 
good. At another level of analysis, the debate is about how best to describe 
institutions: how they function, to what ends, and whether it is possible to 
understand (or persuasively describe) their place in the constitutional 
scheme as promoting or hindering one’s normative preferences. The 
following Part will present analyses of three new constitutional reforms in 
light of these descriptive aims. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the British constitutional debate, much of the focus is on theoretical 
and normative justifications for why one version of constitutionalism is 
 
not commensurate with reality. Id. at 430. General legislative intent does not require Parliament to 
provide rules; it serves rather as a “formal legitimation,” while “tell[ing] us nothing as to the specific 
content thereof.” Id. at 431. 
60 Mark Elliott, The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of 
Administrative Law, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 129, 132 (1999). 
61 See Craig, supra note 58, at 438, 443. 
62 Id. at 431 (discussing “supporters of the common law model”). 
63 ALLAN, supra note 33, at 240. 
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better or worse at protecting constitutional goods; but, as mentioned above, 
there is also a descriptive agenda. How does the British constitutional 
system work? Is it really a legal constitutionalist system hiding under a 
veneer of parliamentary sovereignty? Is the system transitioning “from a 
system based on parliamentary sovereignty to one based on the sovereignty 
of a constitution”?64 
This Part will review a number of new constitutional reforms in light 
of their relevance to the debate between political and legal 
constitutionalists. To understand the broader implications of each reform, it 
is possible to use an institutional shorthand: will the reform serve to 
maintain or limit the power of the U.K. Parliament (Westminster) or might 
it in some way empower the judiciary? Of course, this measure is not 
perfectly calibrated to the underlying questions of constitutionalism: 
political or pragmatic limitations on Parliament may not translate to 
judicially enforced limitations; empowering the courts in a general way 
may not provide external limits on parliamentary power. Nevertheless, 
given the general connection between institutional power and constitutional 
theory, it is possible to gain some insight by observing the changes in 
institutional design. The descriptive analysis of three reforms in this Part—
the Human Rights Act of 1998, the set of devolution acts of 1998 (and the 
various legislative updates and amendments), and the 2005 Constitutional 
Reform Act, which created the new U.K. Supreme Court—provides 
context for the effort, in Part III, to understand how these reforms interact 
and what that interaction might mean for British constitutionalism. 
A. The Human Rights Act (1998) 
The Human Rights Act (HRA), enacted by Parliament in 1998, 
originated in international law almost 50 years earlier. In 1949, the United 
Kingdom, along with nine other European nations,65 founded a regional 
organization called the Council of Europe (CoE). The CoE’s primary goal 
was to craft a human rights charter with the aim of preventing atrocities of 
the type seen during the Second World War. The result was the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention), 
which the United Kingdom ratified in 1951 and which entered into force in 
1953. Under the terms of the Convention and the subsequent case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), after exhausting her 
domestic remedies, a British citizen could petition the European-level 
 
64 BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at xiii. 
65 The original ten countries were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 
1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103. 
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institutions claiming that the United Kingdom had breached her 
Convention rights.66 
In the U.K. courts, however, a litigant could not rely on a Convention 
right (such as the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life) to 
provide protection or a remedy against government action. The United 
Kingdom is a dualist nation, meaning that for instruments of international 
law to have legal effect within the country, the treaty or convention must be 
translated into domestic law, usually through implementing legislation 
enacted by Parliament.67 And the United Kingdom, for over forty-five 
years, had declined to enact such legislation. Litigants seeking to enforce 
their Convention rights had little choice other than to proceed at the 
European level. 
In 1997, the Blair government proposed incorporating many of the 
European Convention rights into domestic law,68 thus “giv[ing] people . . . 
easier access to their Convention rights.”69 In a White Paper called Rights 
Brought Home, the government argued that national legislation, through the 
proposed HRA, would allow people in the United Kingdom to raise rights 
claims “in British courts rather than having to incur the cost and delay of 
taking a case to . . . Strasbourg.”70 The HRA thus served to update British 
rights protection,71 while bringing the United Kingdom into line with its 
European allies that already included Convention rights within their 
 
66 Initially a petition was lodged with the Commission on Human Rights, which, in certain cases, 
would forward it to the Court for review; now petitions go directly to the Court (or, more accurately, 
one of its Committees). See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
arts. 25, 48, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]; Protocol No. 11 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control 
Machinery Established Thereby art. 34, opened for signature May 11, 1994, 2061 U.N.T.S. 7 (entered 
into force Nov. 1, 1998) [hereinafter Convention Protocol No. 11]. 
67 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 310, 314–15, 319 (1992). 
68 The Convention was not fully incorporated—critically, Article 13 of the Convention providing 
for an effective remedy was not included as a protected right in the Human Rights Act. The solution—
declarations of incompatibility in the face of Acts of Parliament violating human rights—is far from a 
meaningful remedial solution. See Burden v. United Kingdom [GC], 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 49 
paras. 22, 40–44. 
69 HOME OFFICE, RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997, Cm. 3782, at 2–6 
(U.K.) [hereinafter RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME]. 
70 Tony Blair, Preface by the Prime Minister to RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 69, at 1. 
71 Prior to the HRA, rights in the British system were protected through the common law. Dicey 
thought the evolutionary approach of common law preferable to the “paper” documents protecting 
rights in systems such as the French (or, though he did not draw the contrast, the American). Cf. 
HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 119 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that “it 
might be necessary to research hundreds of years of case law” to understand the scope and content of a 
given right). For a brief synopsis of rights protection in the United Kingdom in an American 
comparative perspective, see Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 
37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329 (2002). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 
558
domestic legal orders.72 In this light, the Human Rights Act appears 
modernizing but not shocking to the constitutional system. The 
modernizing story, however, does not provide the full import of the Act. 
The benefit of rights documents lies in their ability to entrench 
protections of minorities against the potential discriminatory actions of 
majoritarian government. But the Blair government went to great lengths to 
reassure observers that the HRA would not challenge in any way the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. As the Home Secretary, a Cabinet 
minister,73 stated in debate over the bill: 
The sovereignty of Parliament must be paramount. By that, I mean that 
Parliament must be competent to make any law on any matter of its 
choosing. . . . The authority to make those decisions derives from a democratic 
mandate. . . . To allow the courts to set aside Acts of Parliament would confer 
on the judiciary a power that it does not possess, and which could draw it into 
serious conflict with Parliament.74 
In short, “bringing rights home” was not intended to change the fact that 
Parliament, in its infinite wisdom, could choose to pass a law that violated 
the Convention, with only the democratic process as a check on its power. 
The details of the HRA thus set out to reconcile the seemingly 
irreconcilable—robust parliamentary sovereignty and entrenched rights 
protection against government action—and scholars disagree about in 
which direction the results trend.75 It is possible to view the HRA as a 
mechanism to ensure procedural attention to rights issues rather than as an 
attempt to provide rights entrenchment.76 For example, Section 19 of the 
Act provides for an enhanced parliamentary process, in which the minister 
in charge of a bill must make a written statement either attesting to the 
 
72 In the Preface, Blair made clear that the introduction of the Human Rights Act was part of the 
government’s “decision to put the promotion of human rights at the forefront of our foreign policy.” 
Blair, supra note 70. For a discussion of monist European states that apply the Convention as part of 
their domestic law, see Rainer Arnold, Reflections on the Universality of Human Rights, in 16 THE 
UNIVERSALISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 6–7 (Rainer Arnold ed., 2013). 
73 Cabinet ministers are collectively responsible for government policy. Cabinet Office, Ministerial 
Code para. 2.3 (2010) (U.K.). 
74 306 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 770 (U.K.). 
75 See BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at 68 (Bogdanor describes the HRA as an uneasy “compromise 
between the doctrines of Parliamentary sovereignty and that of the rule of law. It seeks in a sense to 
muffle the conflict by proposing a dialogue between the judiciary, Parliament and government, all of 
whom are required to observe human rights.”).  
76 As noted in Rights Brought Home: 
To make provision in the Bill for the courts to set aside Acts of Parliament would confer on the 
judiciary a general power over the decisions of Parliament which under our present constitutional 
arrangements they do not possess, and would be likely on occasions to draw the judiciary into 
serious conflict with Parliament. There is no evidence to suggest that they desire this power, nor 
that the public wish them to have it. Certainly, this Government has no mandate for any such 
change.  
RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 69, para. 2.13. 
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compatibility of the bill with the Convention rights or, if incompatible, 
clearly acknowledging the government’s intent “to proceed with the Bill” 
nevertheless.77 By placing a responsibility on the government to assess the 
rights implications of any proposed legislation, the HRA enhances the 
potential for democratic accountability to function as a constraint on 
Parliament. But the Act does not rest on political accountability alone: in 
addition to procedural mechanisms within the parliamentary process, 
Sections 3 and 4 introduce a role for the courts in rights protection. Under 
these sections, courts have new responsibilities in interpreting or reviewing 
primary legislation passed by Parliament.78 
Section 3 provides what might be best understood as a canon of 
interpretation to be used by the courts, by stating that “[s]o far as it is 
possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be 
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights.”79 This interpretive measure goes beyond the traditional canons of 
statutory construction,80 and it does not incorporate a notion of deference to 
legislative choice.81 Courts have been willing to use the power: in R 
(Hammond) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Criminal 
Justice Act of 2003, requiring High Court judges to conduct certain 
criminal review procedures without an oral hearing, was interpreted to 
include implied judicial discretion to order an oral hearing if necessary to 
comply with Convention rights.82 Furthermore, this power to interpret Acts 
of Parliament in light of the HRA has been understood as imparting some 
 
77 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 19 (U.K.). 
78 Note that rights review is also relevant for secondary legislation. Procedural review of executive 
or administration action preexisted the HRA, but even that review was a fairly recent element of British 
jurisprudence, stemming from the standards of reasonableness outlined in the Wednesbury case of 1947. 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp, [1947] EWCA (Civ) 1, [1948] 1 K.B. 
223. From both an American and European perspective, Wednesbury reasonableness review is a very 
weak form of review—a level of deference more Skidmore than Chevron, and nothing as searching as 
the proportionality review used by the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting the Convention. 
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944). On proportionality, see generally NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN 
EUROPEAN LAW (1996). See also Michael Taggart, Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury, 2008 N.Z. 
L. REV. 423, 427–40 (discussing Wednesbury review and proportionality review in U.K. law). 
79 Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42, § 3. 
80 See MASTERMAN, supra note 2, at 152 (“[I]t is widely acknowledged that the HRA provides the 
judiciary with much broader powers of interpretation than provided for by the traditional canons of 
statutory construction.”). The judicial interpretation of the HRA is not subject to ambiguity rules, nor 
limited by enactments passed earlier in time. See, e.g., R v. A, [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 A.C. 45 
(H.L.) [44] (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Steyn) (“[I]t will sometimes be necessary to adopt an 
interpretation which linguistically may appear strained. The techniques to be used will not only involve 
the reading down of express language in a statute but also the implication of provisions.”). 
81 See MASTERMAN, supra note 2, at 172. 
82 [2005] UKHL 69, [2006] 1 A.C. 603 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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level of entrenchment to the HRA itself.83 Lord Justice Laws, in the much-
referenced case Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, concluded that the 
HRA was a “constitutional statute” and could not be impliedly repealed by 
subsequent legislation, placing on Parliament the burden of explicit 
repeal.84 
Section 4 authorized the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
(Britain’s highest court in 1998) and the high courts of the regions to 
declare a piece of primary legislation “incompatible” with the HRA. Such a 
declaration does not “affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given; and . . . is not 
binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.”85 There is, 
therefore, no power to strike down acts passed by Parliament.86 Some 
commentators see Section 3 as undermining parliamentary sovereignty, 
given the judges’ power “to control the interpretation of legislation not yet 
passed,” and Section 4 as preserving parliamentary sovereignty, given that 
“the continuing legality of [incompatible legislation] remains 
unquestioned.”87 Section 4 may nevertheless present a pragmatic challenge 
to parliamentary sovereignty. Even though “the legality of challenged Acts 
remains unquestioned, the difference between a direct power [to] strike 
down [an Act], and the potential for a declaration of incompatibility to 
undermine the political authority of a statute or its provisions, may be a 
fine one.”88 As James Madison said, though they appear weak, paper 
barriers “have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to 
establish the public opinion in their favor, [and] may be one means to 
control the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise 
 
83 Alison Young argues that rights can be entrenched without undermining parliamentary 
sovereignty, but her argument requires some reinterpretation of Dicey and a reformulated definition of 
parliamentary sovereignty. See YOUNG, supra note 44. Young proposes that “Dicey’s theory is best 
understood as a theory of ‘continuing parliamentary legislative supremacy,’” id. at 15, and that there is 
the “possibility of entrenchment within [this] theory . . . through the modification of the definition of 
legally valid legislation, provided that such modification cannot be made by Parliament acting alone.” 
Id. at 23. 
84 [2002] EWHC (Admin) 195, [2003] Q.B. 151 [62]–[63]. More recently, in Parliamentary 
Debate, Lord Pannick argued, “one of the central purposes of human rights law is to protect the interests 
of those sections of the community who lack political power, who Parliament has failed to protect 
against unfair treatment by the majority.” 727 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2011) 1502 (U.K.). 
85 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (U.K.). 
86 This fact raises questions about whether Section 4 is truly an “effective remedy” for a victim of a 
rights violation, for purposes of Article 13 of the Convention. See, e.g., Burden v. United Kingdom 
[GC], 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 49, para. 39. 
87 MASTERMAN, supra note 2, at 48. 
88 Id. at 152. 
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inclined.”89 And, in fact, to date, most declarations of incompatibility have 
been quickly remedied.90 
One final aspect of the HRA that bears noting is its recalibration of the 
British courts’ relationship to the ECtHR. Prior to 1998, individuals could 
not enforce their Convention rights in British courts, and British courts 
were not inclined to take ECtHR decisions into account when developing 
rights under the common law. Now, however, courts and tribunals “must 
take into account” relevant judgments of the ECtHR when addressing 
rights questions under the HRA.91 The judgments of the ECtHR are not 
binding, but the HRA encourages the opening of a dialogue between the 
ECtHR and the British courts. As the White Paper noted, “British judges 
will be enabled to make a distinctively British contribution to the 
development of the jurisprudence of human rights in Europe.”92 
B. The Devolution Acts (1998 et seq.) 
Even prior to the series of Acts that in 1998 devolved power to 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, scholars had struggled with 
categorizing the structure of the United Kingdom—it has always been 
something of a compilation.93 The United Kingdom came into being 
 
89 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (James Madison). 
90 In fact, between 2000, when the HRA went into effect, and July 2012, there were nineteen 
declarations of incompatibility not subject to appeal. Of these (as of July 31, 2012), eleven had been 
remedied by subsequent primary legislation; three were “remedied by a remedial order under” HRA 
Section 10; four “had already been remedied by primary legislation at the time of the declaration” for 
incompatibility; and one was under consideration. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RESPONDING TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS JUDGMENTS, REPORT TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGMENTS 2011–12, 2012, Cm. 8432, at 40 (U.K.). The response by 
Parliament to the Court suggests some support for James R. Rogers’s theory that a legislature might 
seek to enable judicial review as an information-forcing benefit. He has argued, in the American 
context, that judicial review allows for signaling between Congress and the Court. Because Congress 
cannot know ex ante if its legislation will be effective or achieve its intended goals, it must rely on the 
Court’s unique form of ex post review to provide further information to aid in recalibration or 
correction. See Rogers, supra note 12, at 84–85. For an updated analysis of Section 4 (s4) 
incompatibility declarations (including a twentieth declaration that is under consideration), see Jeff 
King, Parliament’s Role Following s4 Declarations of Incompatibility, in PARLIAMENTS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: REDRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT (Murray Hunt et al. eds., forthcoming 2014) (on file 
with author). 
91 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 2 (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
92  RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 69, para. 1.14. 
93 See, e.g., Stein Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL 
IDENTITY: STUDIES IN EUROPEAN REGIONALISM 1, 11–12 (Stein Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin eds., 
1982) (describing the United Kingdom as a “union state” made up of different nations); Stephen 
Tierney, Rights Versus Democracy? The Bill of Rights in Plurinational States, in RIGHTS IN DIVIDED 
SOCIETIES 11, 11, 13–14 (Colin Harvey & Alex Schwartz eds., 2012) (describing the U.K. as a 
“[p]lurinational” state); see also Brigid Hadfield, The United Kingdom as a Territorial State, in THE 
BRITISH CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 54, at 585, 585 (noting that “[t]he 
Speaker’s Conference on Devolution, which reported in 1920, used the term ‘component portions’” to 
describe the subnational entities making up the United Kingdom). 
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through a series of agreements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
beginning with the 1707 Acts of Union, in which the Kingdom of England 
and Wales was united with the Kingdom of Scotland, to be known as 
“Great Britain” and ruled by a united Parliament at Westminster.94 And in 
1800, another set of Acts united the Kingdom of Great Britain with that of 
Ireland, leading to the creation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland.95 In 1922, Southern Ireland achieved a measure of independence,96 
eventually cutting all ties to Britain and becoming the Republic of Ireland 
in 1949.97 Northern Ireland elected to remain within the United Kingdom. 
Notwithstanding scholarly arguments that the 1707 and 1800 Acts of 
Union had a confederal nature,98 in practice the Acts incorporated the new 
regions into the dominant English system.99 And it is thus unsurprising that 
after their passage, various subgroups immediately sought more power. In 
Ireland, union led only to the long and painful process of separation.100 
Scottish separation has proceeded at a slower pace. The 1707 Act of Union 
with Scotland contemplated a Scottish Office within the British 
bureaucracy to represent Scottish interests, but it was not until the late 
nineteenth century that the Scottish Secretary took on an important role in 
the British Cabinet.101 Pressure for devolution mounted in the late 1960s 
and 1970s with the electoral successes of the Scottish National Party.102 
Finally, in Wales, the movement for localized power has been more recent; 
notwithstanding electoral success by the Welsh national party, Plaid 
Cymru, in the 1960s, the people of Wales have been slower to seek 
autonomy.103 Alone among the four nations, England has not sought 
 
94 Union with Scotland (Amendment) Act, 1707, 6 Ann., c. 40 (Eng.); Union with England Act, 
1707, 6 Ann., c. 7 (Scot.). Wales had been incorporated into England earlier, through the Laws of 
Wales Acts in 1535 and 1542. Laws in Wales Act, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 26 (Eng.); Laws in Wales Act, 
1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 26 (Eng.). 
95 Union with Ireland Act, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67 (Gr. Brit.); Act of Union (Ireland), 1800, 40 
Geo. 3, c. 38 (Ir.). 
96 See Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland, Dec. 6, 1921, U.K.-
Ire., 114 B.S.P. 161 (Anglo–Irish Treaty of 1921); The Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922 (Session 
2), 13 Geo. 5, c. 1. 
97 See generally ALVIN JACKSON, HOME RULE: AN IRISH HISTORY 1800–2000 (2003) [hereinafter 
JACKSON, HOME RULE]. 
98 See, e.g., J.D.B. MITCHELL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69–70 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing the 
intentions of negotiators). 
99 ALVIN JACKSON, THE TWO UNIONS: IRELAND, SCOTLAND, AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, 1707–2007, at 108 (2012) [hereinafter JACKSON, TWO UNIONS] (describing the Acts as “not 
so much about the union of parliaments, as about the incorporation of the Scots and Irish legislatures 
within those of England and Great Britain”). 
100 See generally JACKSON, HOME RULE, supra note 97. 
101 See JACKSON, TWO UNIONS, supra note 99, at 141. 
102 See MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 111–27. 
103 Our History, PARTY OF WALES, http://www.partyofwales.org/our-history (last visited Mar. 23, 
2014). In 1979, referendums were held in Wales and in Scotland on devolution, and only 20.3% of the 
Welsh voting public sought greater autonomy. In Scotland, the number was 51.6%. See RICHARD 
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independence or national power, most likely because England is the largest 
of the regions and most often treated as synonymous with the whole.104 
Given this history of devolved power being both sought and granted, some 
view the 1998 reforms as points along a continuum of change, not a 
fundamental reset or restructuring of the “State.”105 
The devolution acts—the Scotland Act (1998), the Government of 
Wales Act (1998), and the Northern Ireland Act (1998)—divide legislative 
responsibilities between Westminster and the institutions of the devolved 
regions. The focus in this Article will be on devolution in Scotland, which 
“is perhaps the best example of possible internal transformations in the 
concept of sovereignty,” due to its “historical claims to self-government.”106 
The asymmetry inherent in the devolutionary settlement complicates a 
detailed analysis of all three regions. Not only do specific substantive 
powers differ amongst the regions, but initially only Scotland and Northern 
Ireland had power to enact primary legislation in the Scottish Parliament 
and Northern Ireland Assembly, respectively. The National Assembly for 
Wales was given a more marginal range of powers and authority. Although 
recent legislation has expanded its remit to include primary legislative 
authority,107 the Welsh Assembly is only beginning to engage with major 
questions of divided power. And Northern Ireland is likewise idiosyncratic. 
The structure of its devolutionary settlement is quite different from that of 
Wales or Scotland: the agreement providing for devolution in Northern 
Ireland was signed by the United Kingdom and Ireland, two sovereign 
states.108 
At a high level of generality, these new institutions at the regional 
level “did not involve a revolution in constitutional design.”109 The integrity 
of parliamentary sovereignty is upheld as a de jure matter: Parliament 
devolved power and, in theory, could take it back. The Blair government 
articulated this principle clearly, maintaining that devolution was no more 
than an effort to modernize the constitution, and that the Westminster 
Parliament would “remain sovereign in all matters.”110 Under Section 28 of 
 
DEWDNEY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, RESEARCH PAPER 97/113, RESULTS OF DEVOLUTION 
REFERENDUMS (1979 & 1997) 9–10 (1997). 
104 For example, Bagehot’s book is entitled The English Constitution rather than The British 
Constitution or The Constitution of the United Kingdom. See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. rev. ed. 1873). 
105 See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 13 (decrying “Year Zero” assumptions about the Blair 
government’s reforms). 
106 David Jenkins, Both Ends Against the Middle: European Integration, Devolution, and the Sites 
of Sovereignty in the United Kingdom, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 17 (2002). 
107 Government of Wales Act, 2006, c. 32 (U.K.). 
108 See BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at 90–93. 
109 MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 15. 
110 Id. at 134–35 (citing SCOTLAND OFFICE, SCOTLAND’S PARLIAMENT, 1997, Cm. 3658, at para. 
4.2) (“The UK Parliament is and will remain sovereign in all matters: but as part of the Government’s 
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the Scotland Act of 1998,111 the Scottish Parliament (Holyrood) is given 
power to make primary laws under a “general legislative competence,”112 
which is subject to a set of limitations.113 Critically, “[t]he power of the 
Westminster Parliament to make laws for Scotland is not affected by 
Scotland’s power to make laws” for Scotland.114 
As with the HRA, the political ramifications of devolution present a 
somewhat different picture.115 The power-sharing principles that underlie 
devolution have been consistently reinforced, including through the 
construction of a £414 million Scottish Parliament building in Edinburgh;116 
the use of conventions establishing practices of dialogue and consent 
between the two parliaments;117 and, most recently, the Scotland Act of 
2012, amending and clarifying the 1998 Act.118 As Lord Steyn has written, 
“A real federal element has de facto been entrenched in our constitutional 
 
resolve to modernise the British constitution Westminster will be choosing to exercise that sovereignty 
by devolving legislative responsibilities to a Scottish Parliament without in any way diminishing its 
own power.”). 
111 Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 28 (U.K.). 
112 See Paul Craig & Mark Walters, The Courts, Devolution and Judicial Review, 1999 P.L. 274, 
274. 
113 A provision is outside the Scottish Parliament’s competence if: 
(a) it would form part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland, or confer or 
remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards Scotland, 
(b) it relates to reserved matters, 
(c) it is in breach of the restrictions in Schedule 4, 
(d) it is incompatible with any Convention rights or with EU law, 
(e) it would remove the Lord Advocate from his position as head of the systems of criminal 
prosecution and investigation of deaths in Scotland. 
Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 29(2) (U.K.) (footnote and alterations omitted). Aside from a list of Acts 
that the Scottish Parliament cannot alter, Schedule 4 also states that “[a]n Act of the Scottish Parliament 
cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, the law on reserved matters.” Id. 
sched. 4, para. 2(1). This has been amended in important ways by the Scotland Act 2012. For a 
discussion, see infra Part III.B. 
114 Craig & Walters, supra note 112, at 281. 
115 “Technically Parliament could repeal the Scotland Act or the Human Rights Act, because 
neither is entrenched; but politically it is inconceivable.” Hazell, supra note 4, at 86. In fact, there was a 
political movement to repeal the HRA in 2012, but Members of Parliament (MPs) defeated the 
proposal. See MPs Block Human Rights Act Repeal Bid, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012, 10:06 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20598122. 
116 See £414m Bill for Holyrood Building, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2007, 3:37 PM), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6382177.stm. 
117 The Sewel Convention, which was developed in the course of negotiations over Scottish 
devolution and is reflected in Devolution Guidance Note 10, establishes the practice that “Westminster 
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the 
Scottish Parliament.” 592 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1998) 791 (U.K.); see also Scotland Act, 1998, 
c. 46, Explanatory Notes, at 40 (noting that Lord Sewel’s statement in the House of Lords “has come to 
be known as the Sewel Convention”). 
118 Scotland Act, 2012, c. 11 (U.K.). 
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arrangements. The simplistic views of Dicey do not fit the contours of 
modern Britain.”119 These changes are becoming “irreversible.”120 
The practical difficulty of rolling back devolution is not the only 
aspect of the 1998 devolutionary settlement that suggests tension with 
parliamentary sovereignty in Westminster. Other elements are notable for 
their divergence from traditional constitutional practices, such as the 
decision by the Blair government to hold regional referendums on 
devolution prior to introducing devolution legislation in Parliament.121 
Referendums highlight the tension between parliamentary sovereignty and 
any conception of popular sovereignty.122 These regional referendums were 
not binding on Parliament, but some scholars argue that in providing 
popular political support to devolution, the referendums have shifted its 
constitutional meaning.123 Due to the preceding referendum in support,124 
the Scotland Act can be seen not merely as a devolution of power from 
Westminster to Holyrood, but as “quasi-autochthonous”125—a “self-
generated . . . constitution” in which “the authority of the Scottish 
Parliament rests less on the sovereign legislative power of Westminster 
than on the consent of the Scottish people themselves.”126 
The “self-generating” nature of the Scotland Act is reinforced by the 
events in the early 1990s that led to devolution: the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC), convened in 1989, met and developed plans for the new 
parliament, “much of which formed the basis for the Scotland Act 1998.”127 
Described as “part political coalition, part a more broadly-based movement 
in civil society,”128 the SCC instantiated the idea of popular sovereignty in 
 
119 JOHAN STEYN, DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW xvi–xvii (2004) (Lord of Appeal in Ordinary). 
120 Hazell, supra note 4, at 86. 
121 BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at 91–92. 
122 See supra Part I; see also Loughlin, supra note 30, at 47 (“[A]ll the most basic constitutional 
ideas—such as sovereignty (does it vest in the commons, or in the crown-in-parliament?), the people 
(do they speak through their local communities, or the several nations, or is this purely as an 
abstraction?), or rights (are these a set of ‘fundamental’ claims or simply concessions conferred by 
law?)—ha[ve] remained in a state of irresolution.”). 
123 See BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at 274; Hadfield, supra note 93, at 626. 
124 Scottish referendum results were clear: with a turnout of 60.2%, the electorate was strongly in 
favor of the establishment of a Scottish Parliament—74.3% for, and 25.7% against. In contrast, in 
Wales the populace was evenly divided in 1997, with 50.3% voting for devolution and 49.7% voting 
against (50.1% turnout). A new Welsh referendum was held in 2011, in which the question was posed: 
“Do you want the Assembly now to be able to make laws on all the matters in the 20 subject areas it has 
powers for?” The turnout was low—only 35.6%—but the yes vote garnered 63.5% and the opposition 
only 36.5%. FEARGAL MCGUINNESS ET AL., HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, RESEARCH PAPER 12/43, 
UK ELECTION STATISTICS: 1918–2012, at 51–53 (2012), available at http://www.parliament.uk/
briefing-papers/rp12-43.pdf. 
125 See Hadfield, supra note 93, at 626. 
126 BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at 274. 
127 Hadfield, supra note 93, at 623 (footnote omitted). 
128 Hazell, supra note 4, at 87. 
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Scotland, and at the 1999 opening of the Scottish Parliament, the SCC’s 
“Claim of Right was ceremonially handed over to the Parliament’s 
presiding officer for its future keeping.”129 Between the referendum on 
devolution, the role of the SCC, and the success of the Scottish National 
Party, there is now a “key focus for patriotism far removed from the British 
state.”130 The burgeoning of this Scottish national feeling is most clearly 
identified in the successful efforts of Alex Salmond, the First Minister of 
Scotland, to arrange a nonbinding referendum on Scottish Independence. 
That referendum is scheduled to take place in September 2014.131 
Parliamentary sovereignty might be undermined by the introduction of 
popular sovereignty and competing subnational parliamentary institutions; 
yet this potential weakening of Westminster does not, in itself, suggest a 
shift from political constitutionalism to legal constitutionalism. Centrifugal 
political forces are not necessarily external constitutional limitations. But 
devolution presents an additional factor to the constitutional analysis: the 
introduction of judicial review. Federalism itself was considered by Dicey 
to be incompatible with the concept of parliamentary sovereignty.132 To the 
extent that division of power required a “fundamental compact, the 
provisions of which control every authority existing under the 
 
129 Hadfield, supra note 93, at 623. 
130 JACKSON, TWO UNIONS, supra note 99, at 179. 
131 The Scottish National Party (SNP), led by Alex Salmond, is the dominant proponent of an 
independent Scotland, having reiterated its commitment to an independence referendum through its 
party manifesto for the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election, in which it won an absolute majority. 
SCOTTISH NAT’L PARTY, MANIFESTO 2011, at 28 (2011), available at http://votesnp.com/campaigns/
SNP_Manifesto_2011_lowRes.pdf. Following “more than eight months of intense negotiations,” 
Salmond and U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron signed the Edinburgh Agreement on October 15, 
2012, granting Holyrood the authority to hold the referendum. See Severin Carrell & Nicholas Watt, 
Alex Salmond Hails Historic Day for Scotland After Referendum Deal, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:03 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/oct/15/alex-salmond-scotland-referendum-deal. Pursuant 
to the recommendation of the Electoral Commission, the referendum question will read: “Do you agree 
that Scotland should be an independent country? Yes/No.” SCOTTISH GOV’T, YOUR SCOTLAND, YOUR 
REFERENDUM 11 (2012). A third option, in the form of greater devolution and more powers for 
Holyrood, will not be available on the referendum ballot (Downing Street denied Salmond’s demand for 
a two-question referendum), but it appears to be the most favored approach in Scotland. See James 
Mitchell, The Scottish Independence Referendum Will Not Offer What Most Scots Want, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 15, 2012, 7:28 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/oct/15/scottish-independence-
referendum-offer-scots. The coalition leading the official campaign in favor of a “yes” vote on the 
referendum—“Yes Scotland”—is made up of the SNP, with support from the Scottish Green Party, the 
Scottish Socialist Party, and Solidarity. See YES SCOTLAND, http://www.yesscotland.net (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014). All three U.K. parties—Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats—oppose 
Scottish independence, and have collectively backed the pro-Union “Better Together” campaign. See 
BETTER TOGETHER, http://www.bettertogether.net (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
132 See A.V. DICEY, ENGLAND’S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE viii (3d ed. London, John Murray 
1887) (“I entertain the firmest conviction that any scheme for Home Rule in Ireland involves dangerous 
if not fatal innovations on the Constitution of Great Britain.”); see also MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 7 
(“The idea of parliamentary sovereignty was central to A.V. Dicey’s arguments against Irish home rule 
and would influence debates on Scotland and Wales later.”). 
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constitution,” there was no way to integrate such limitations with an 
absolute legislative power.133 A neutral arbiter would be necessary to police 
the bounds.134 Given the legal ability of Westminster to undo its grants of 
power to Scotland, the British system is not “federal,” it is devolved.135 But 
to the extent that, politically or pragmatically, devolution cannot be 
undone, the Scotland Act begins to take on the appearance of a federal 
compact. 
The Scotland Act 1998 recognized that “devolution issues”—
questions concerning the scope of the power granted to the devolved 
level—were likely to arise.136 It was decided that the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council would be given jurisdiction to hear and decide upon 
these issues.137 The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, the U.K.’s 
highest court in civil litigation and most criminal litigation, was 
deliberately not given this responsibility. As Lady Hale of Richmond, a 
sitting Justice of the Supreme Court, has explained, “as long as the apex 
court of the United Kingdom was a committee of the Westminster 
Parliament, it might not be seen as an independent and impartial judge of a 
dispute between that Parliament and the devolved institutions.”138 
The Privy Council was both an obvious and unusual choice for this 
role. It is an institution with experience in the demarcation of boundaries 
 
133 DICEY, supra note 25, at 141. 
134 K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 58–59 (4th ed. 1963). 
135 See M.A. FAZAL, A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 15 (1997). 
136 The Act defined “devolution issue” to mean: 
(a) a question whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament or any provision of an Act of the 
Scottish Parliament is within the legislative competence of the Parliament, 
(b) a question whether any function (being a function which any person has purported, or is 
proposing, to exercise) is a function of the Scottish Ministers, the First Minister or the Lord 
Advocate, 
(c) a question whether the purported or proposed exercise of a function by a member of the 
Scottish Executive is, or would be, within devolved competence, 
(d) a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of a function by a member of the 
Scottish Executive is, or would be, incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with 
EU law, 
(e) a question whether a failure to act by a member of the Scottish Executive is incompatible 
with any of the Convention rights or with EU law, 
(f) any other question about whether a function is exercisable within devolved competence or 
in or as regards Scotland and any other question arising by virtue of this Act about reserved 
matters. 
Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, sched. 6, para. 1 (footnotes and alterations omitted) (note that the references 
to EU law were added after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2011). The Scotland Act 2012 
changes this definition and designation to “compatibility issue[s].” Scotland Act, 2012, c. 11, § 34. For 
discussion, see infra Part III. 
137 Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, sched. 6 (original version referring to judicial committee), available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/schedule/6/enacted. 
138 Brenda Hale, From County Hall to Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 12, 23 (Chris Miele ed., 2010). 
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inherent in federalism, due to its role in hearing litigation arising from 
overseas territories, dependencies, and the Commonwealth—countries and 
political systems with historic links to the British Empire. In particular, the 
Privy Council conducts review of provincial legislation for conformity with 
parliamentary acts.139 But this natural substantive strength also presented a 
threat. In the 1970s, when the first meaningful political discussion of 
devolution for Scotland took place, the bureaucrats meeting to discuss 
possible legislation “rejected a ‘constitutional tribunal such as the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council’ as ‘entirely contrary to the spirit of 
devolution within a unitary state with one sovereign Parliament.’ This, they 
maintained, ‘should not be contemplated.’”140 Their concern was 
undoubtedly driven by the fact that the Privy Council played an important 
constitutional role during the first half of the twentieth century, 
encouraging a “flirtation” with the idea of judicial review.141 However, by 
1998, the Privy Council’s “constitutional jurisdiction in the rest of the 
Commonwealth ha[d] declined almost to zero,” and it had little of the 
strength and stature of the Appellate Committee in the House of Lords.142 
The earlier threats seemed of little relevance. 
At the time, “devolution issues” were expected to be solely questions 
regarding the interpretation of the devolution acts and the division of 
competences therein—in other words, litigation focused on which level of 
government could legislate on what subjects. And the Scotland Act, like the 
HRA, provided a canon of construction for the courts when addressing 
devolution issues: Section 101 requires courts to make every effort to 
interpret primary and secondary legislation from Scotland as vires, even if 
such a reading requires narrowing the legislation in question.143 In 2003, 
constitutional scholar Nevil Johnson considered it unlikely that “frequent 
reference” would be made to the Privy Council and assumed, as did many, 
that most devolution issues would be resolved through political means.144 
Johnson was right, insofar as “devolution issues” remained questions 
of the interpretation of the Scotland Act. But rather than litigation 
surrounding the meaning of reserved or delegated powers, most challenges 
claimed Scottish legislation, or acts of the Scottish executive, were ultra 
vires due to their incompatibility with the Convention.145 These devolution 
issues raising rights questions were still addressed by the Judicial 
 
139 Stefan Voigt et al., Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence—The Case of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 82 J. DEV. ECON. 348, 355–56 (2007) (discussing the history, 
jurisdiction, and institutional design of the Privy Council). 
140 MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 120–21. 
141 Stevens, supra note 54, at 333, 340, 342. 
142 Hazell, supra note 4, at 93. 
143 Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 101. 
144 See NEVIL JOHNSON, RESHAPING THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 195 (2004). 
145 See infra Part III. 
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Committee of the Privy Council as the court of last resort, but in all other 
cases, final HRA interpretation rested with the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords. The possibility of conflicting interpretations of rights and 
other tensions between the two courts only highlighted the lack of attention 
given by the government to the impact of devolution on the judiciary.146 
This latter anomaly was resolved through the enactment of the 
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, which introduced a Supreme Court to 
the United Kingdom. 
C. The Constitutional Reform Act (2005) 
On June 12, 2003, in a press release concerning a Cabinet reshuffle,147 
the Blair government stated its intention to abolish the office of the Lord 
Chancellor and remake the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
into a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom.148 Earlier announcements of 
proposed constitutional change may have seemed incoherent when viewed 
in the aggregate,149 but no individual proposal was as poorly presented as 
these changes to the judiciary.150 The government failed to conduct 
consultations,151 and “[s]enior members of the judiciary . . . were given only 
a few hours’ or minutes’ notice of the announcement.”152 As Lord Woolf 
said, “it came as an immense shock.”153 The government’s announcement 
created something of a firestorm—or as much of a firestorm as can exist in 
 
146 Cf. Hazell, supra note 4, at 93 (“In the government more thought has been given to the judicial 
impact of [the HRA] than of devolution.”). The likelihood of conflict may have been mitigated by the 
fact that there is considerable overlap in the judges who staff both the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
147 CHARLES BANNER & ALEXANDER DEANE, OFF WITH THEIR WIGS! 19 (2003). 
148 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, CP 11/03, at 4–6 (2003), http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf; 
Andrew Le Sueur, From Appellate Committee to Supreme Court: A Narrative, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE 
OF LORDS 1876–2009, at 64 (Louis Blom-Cooper et al. eds., 2009). 
149 See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of forethought concerning 
legal issues presented by the interaction between the devolution acts and the HRA). 
150 Less than eight months after the initial proposal, Prime Minister Tony Blair “conceded that 
combining constitutional reforms with a Cabinet reshuffle . . . had not been a good idea: ‘I think we 
could have in retrospect—this is entirely my responsibility—done it better.’” Le Sueur, supra note 148, 
at 75 (quoting Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, House of Commons Liaison Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Feb. 
3, 2004); see also Tom Bingham, Law Lords and Justices, in THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, supra note 138, at 36, 38 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Senior Law Lord of the United 
Kingdom; Lord Chief Justice) (“Early indications were that the proposals had not been very fully 
thought out.”). 
151 Judges pointed out that the previous round of changes to the judicial architecture, implemented 
between 1867 and 1876, had benefited from consultations with various committees and a Royal 
Commission. Bingham, supra note 150, at 38 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Senior Law Lord of the 
United Kingdom; Lord Chief Justice). 
152 Le Sueur, supra note 148, at 71. 
153 Id. (citing Lord Woolf, Speech at the University of Hertfordshire: A New Constitutional 
Consensus (Feb. 10, 2005)). 
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the measured and judicious remarks of the senior judiciary.154 Even those 
inclined to agree with the need for change were dismayed by the lack of 
thought put into the proposal.155 
The proposed reforms were “initially thought—at least by their 
authors—to be a non-contentious change to the machinery of 
government.”156 Recent case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights had raised questions about separation of powers within Britain, and 
the government sought to clarify institutional relationships to forestall any 
detrimental litigation.157 As with other constitutional reforms, the main 
argument was one of modernization: in this case, to ensure a robust and 
transparent separation of powers and an independent judiciary.158 No one 
position better encapsulated the confusing overlap of power and 
responsibility than the Lord Chancellor’s office. The Lord Chancellor was 
at once the presiding officer of the House of Lords, the head of the judicial 
branch, and in government a member of the Cabinet. This “holy trinity . . . 
could not go on.”159 And by the early twenty-first century,160 the position of 
the Appellate Committee in the House of Lords suggested that the tribunal 
might not be truly independent,161 as required by Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.162 
 
154 See BANNER & DEANE, supra note 147, at 7, 15, 19–20. 
155 See House of Lords Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 
Supplementary Response of Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Nov. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldcref/125/4042208.htm (“I am in principle 
in favour of setting up a United Kingdom Supreme Court and therefore would support a properly 
structured and implemented proposal. However the Consultation Paper does not contain such a 
proposal.”); see also STEYN, supra note 119, at xx (Lord of Appeal in Ordinary) (“[T]he obvious and 
sensible decision to create a Supreme Court was handled in a singularly inept way and caused 
widespread resentment.”). 
156 MASTERMAN, supra note 2, at 219. 
157 The ECtHR case law was only one argument for constitutional change. Some observers suggest 
internal politics and power dynamics drove the initial push for change. See Le Sueur, supra note 148, at 
67 (discussing relationship between David Blunkett (Home Secretary) and Lord Irvine (Lord 
Chancellor)). 
158 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 926–27 (U.K.). 
159 Inquiry on Judicial Appointments Process: Unrevised Transcript of Evidence Taken Before the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 1–2 (Evidence Sess. No. 4, Oct. 12, 2011). 
160 Concerns about the independence of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords have a 
storied lineage. Walter Bagehot, in his canonical 1867 The English Constitution, decried the fact that 
the supreme court of the nation was housed in the upper house of Parliament, calling for “a great 
conspicuous tribunal, . . . not [one] hidden beneath the robes of a legislative assembly.” WALTER 
BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 159 (London, Chapman & Hall 1867). 
161 See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 116 (2009); see also ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: 
THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 104–06 (rev. ed. 2005). Notwithstanding a strong 
convention against Law Lords voting on controversial legislation, see RICHARD CORNES, REFORMING 
THE LORDS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW LORDS (1999), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-
publications/42.pdf, in 2004 two Law Lords voted and spoke against the proposed Hunting Act, forcing 
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Notwithstanding a general and growing agreement that the British 
situation was anomalous in contemporary constitutional systems—as 
Bagehot said, no constitutional theorist would assign the judicial function 
to a second legislative chamber163—the response to the Blair government’s 
proposals “illustrated quite conclusively that what was thought . . . to be a 
routine amendment . . . was in fact a series of changes of immense 
constitutional significance.”164 A final bill was not passed until 2005, after 
months of negotiations and consultations.165 
The primary change wrought by the 2005 Constitutional Reform Act 
(Reform Act) was, as intended, its creation of an unequivocally 
independent judiciary.166 The most dramatic shift was in the altered role of 
the Lord Chancellor: the position is now that of an executive minister, the 
Secretary of State for Justice,167 and no longer comprises judicial or 
legislative functions.168 In addition, the Act provided that the Appellate 
Committee would be removed from the House of Lords and reconstituted 
as a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The Supreme Court would 
function in most ways as the Appellate Committee had done, mirroring its 
jurisdictional remit. The only additional grant of power was over 
devolution issues; the Reform Act redistributed this power from the Privy 
Council to the new Supreme Court as a tidying-up exercise, removing the 
potential for conflict between the two institutions.169 
The Scottish Executive eventually supported the legislation,170 but 
initially, proposals for “a ‘Supreme Court of the United Kingdom’ were 
 
recusals in the subsequent challenges to the Act. See Hale, supra note 138, at 21. Lay peers have not 
voted in legal appeals since 1844. See Stevens, supra note 54, at 334. 
162 Convention, supra note 66, art. 6(1). 
163 BAGEHOT, supra note 104, at 188. 
164 MASTERMAN, supra note 2, at 243. 
165 Le Sueur, supra note 148. Prior to the 2003 announcement, it appeared that the Blair 
government had failed to engage with the Scottish Executive on the issue, and that the Scottish judiciary 
and Scottish Law Lords were opposed to the proposals. In an interview on BBC Scotland shortly after 
the announcement, Lord Hope of Craighead, a Scottish Law Lord (now on the Supreme Court), 
“warned of the need to protect the integrity of the Scottish legal system and said that there were many 
as yet unanswered questions.” Id. at 69, 71. 
166 See MASTERMAN, supra note 2, at 31 (arguing that the Reform Act “may come to be seen as 
having cemented the status of judicial independence as a constitutional fundamental in the UK 
constitution”). 
167 His title was initially Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. The Secretary of State for 
Constitutional Affairs Order 2003, S.I. 2003/1887. 
168 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, §§ 2–22. 
169 Id. §§ 40–41. The impact of this jurisdictional shift will be discussed infra Part III. Other 
scholars have argued, in more general terms, that this “concentration” of power has been a factor in the 
development of the new Supreme Court as a constitutional court. See Aurélie Duffy-Meunier, La Cour 
suprême au Royaume-Uni après le Constitutional Reform Act 2005: une juridiction hors norme, 
64 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 681, 694 (2012). 
170 Le Sueur, supra note 148, at 81–82. 
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viewed with great suspicion and indeed hostility from Scotland.”171 There 
was fear the Court “might take on the role of policing the Scottish system 
on behalf of [the United Kingdom].”172 The Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords had a contested historical jurisdiction over civil appeals 
from Scotland; but it had no jurisdiction over criminal appeals from the 
High Court of Justiciary in Scotland. A major concern of the Scottish 
judges was the integrity of the separate Scottish legal system; assurances 
were sought, and given, that the creation of the Supreme Court would not 
alter the Scottish system.173 Neither the Scottish Executive nor the Blair 
government analyzed whether these assurances would be compatible with 
the Court’s new jurisdiction over devolution issues. 
To provide continuity, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary—the Law 
Lords—became the initial twelve Supreme Court Justices,174 and in October 
2009, the Supreme Court opened the doors to its new home in the 
renovated Middlesex Guildhall.175 By turning the court of last resort from a 
committee of a legislative branch into a Supreme Court, and housing it in 
its own building across Parliament Square, the Act provided a visual and 
physical demonstration of a functional separation.176 The architect that 
renovated the Court’s new home suggested that “[i]t is hoped that the front 
door of the Supreme Court might, in time, achieve the same kind of instant 
public recognition” as 10 Downing Street.177 But others recognized that a 
higher profile may bring unwanted attention; as Lady Hale said, “[T]he 
more we are the new institution, and not the sort of old cozy protected 
institution in the House of Lords, I can see the more we’re going to be 
under fire for the things that we do.”178 
 
 * * * 
 
Each individual reform reflects the contested nature of British 
constitutionalism. The HRA both strengthens the judiciary and remains 
 
171 C.M.G. Himsworth, Devolution and Its Jurisdictional Asymmetries, 70 M.L.R. 31, 38 (2007). 
172 Id. at 39. 
173 See id. at 38 (“The absence of an appeal on criminal matters is viewed as an issue of high 
principle.”). 
174 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, §§ 23–24. 
175 Hugh Feilden, The Design of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, in THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 138, at 138, 140, 161 (architect). 
176 Louis E. Wolcher, A Philosophical Investigation into Methods of Constitutional Interpretation 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 276 (2006) (“[The] 
physical separation is not just cosmetic, however—it also symbolizes a deeper functional separation.”). 
177 Feilden, supra note 175, at 150. 
178 Justice Ginsburg and Baroness Hale: The British and United States Legal Systems, SUPREME 
COURT FELLOWS PROGRAM ALUMNI ASSOC’N & GEORGETOWN LAW SUPREME COURT INST. 1:23:04–
:16 (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID
=473. 
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faithful, as a formal matter, to parliamentary sovereignty. Devolution 
likewise protects the ultimate authority of the Westminster Parliament, but 
the Scottish Parliament, in particular, has a separate source of popular 
support, challenging parliamentary sovereignty. Yet political tensions 
between legislatures do not reflect external limitations on Westminster that 
can be enforced by courts. Finally, the creation of a new Supreme Court 
may bring focus and attention to the judicial branch, but it is unclear that 
the Court will choose to act at the outer limits of its authority. If these 
reforms serve “to extend the judicial role into spheres more frequently 
associated with the elected branches of government and to enhance the 
institutional separation of the judges from the executive and legislative 
branches,”179 what then are their interactive effects? Will such interaction 
“make the cumulative impact [of the reforms] greater?”180 In order to shed 
new light onto this constitutional debate, Part III will situate these 
individual reforms in a broader and connected framework—that of 
multilevel governance and theories of federalism. 
III. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
REFORM IN CONTEXT 
The individual constitutional reforms discussed in Part II are 
embedded in a broader system of multilevel governance.181 In this schema, 
the United Kingdom and its national institutions are sandwiched between 
devolved legislatures and supranational courts. There are, therefore, 
multiple relationships that affect the constitutional understanding: that 
between the Westminster Parliament and the European Court of Human 
Rights,182 between Westminster and Holyrood, between Holyrood and the 
Supreme Court, between the Scottish courts and the Supreme Court, and of 
course, between the Supreme Court and Westminster itself. This final 
relationship drives the meta-understanding of British constitutionalism—as 
political or legal constitutionalism—and this Part seeks to understand how 
that dynamic is affected by the other links in this multilevel system. 
The multiple levels of governance in the British system create a kind 
of quasi-federalism. And the new Supreme Court serves as a quasi-federal 
 
179 MASTERMAN, supra note 2, at 32. 
180 Hazell, supra note 4, at 86 (“These are new pillars of our constitution. They will in turn release 
a political and legal dynamic which is much greater than we can currently foresee. In part this is 
because of interactive effects which will make the cumulative impact greater.”). 
181 Cf. PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-LAYERED CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 1; Nicholas Bamforth 
& Peter Leyland, Public Law in a Multi-layered Constitution, in PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-LAYERED 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 3, 3 (discussing the British constitution as a “[m]ulti-[l]ayered” 
constitution). 
182 Other relationships in this multilevel scheme include those with the institutions of the European 
Union institutions, such as between Westminster and the European Court of Justice, and between the 
European Court of Justice and the Supreme Court. 
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court.183 Dicey, the great expositor of parliamentary sovereignty, was wary 
of federalism.184 He equated it with “legalism” and worried that it would 
naturally lead to “the predominance of the judiciary in the constitution.”185 
Recent scholarship suggests that, at least in the United States, the federal 
system might have played an important role in the rise of judicial power.186 
Drawing on this range of scholarship, this Part will discuss two key aspects 
of federalist or multilevel systems that assist in cementing a court’s 
centrality: first, the prevalence of boundary disputes, and second, pressures 
for uniformity. In addition, political science literature sheds light on how 
judicial empowerment evolves through interbranch relationships and repeat 
decisions by political actors. 
As this Part acknowledges, the Court’s actions and opportunities do 
not cohere in every respect with predictions of increased power.187 But a 
richer, more nuanced understanding of the possibilities presented by the 
interactive effects of these reforms aids those legal constitutionalists who 
draw on these descriptive accounts for support. Furthermore, the judiciary 
must accrue a certain amount of institutional and political credibility before 
legal constitutionalists can realistically expect any decision limiting 
parliamentary power to be accepted.188 And the evidence suggests the 
British judiciary is very much on the rise. 
 
183 The Court’s new crest includes symbols of the four “nations” within the United Kingdom. 
Supreme Court Emblem, SUP. CT., http://www.supremecourt.uk/visiting/new-artwork.html#emblem 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014). At the Court’s dedication, the Poet Laureate read these lines: “New 
structures but an old foundation stone: / The mind of Justice still at liberty / Four nations separate but 
linked as one: / The light of reason falling equally.” Andrew Motion, Poet Laureate, 1999–2009, Lines 
for the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 138, at 9, 9. 
184 See DICEY, supra note 132, at viii. 
185 DICEY, supra note 25, at 170. 
186 See, e.g., Jenna Bednar, Response, The Dialogic Theory of Judicial Review: A New Social 
Science Research Agenda, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1178, 1183–84 (2010) (“Perhaps federalism can be 
credited as a catalyst establishing the Court’s legitimacy, attracting public attention, seeding public 
confidence in it, and fostering public acceptance of judicial review.”). 
187 The appointment of Jonathan Sumption as a Justice of the Court has been suggested by some as 
evidence of a coming retrenchment or retreat of judicial power. See Tomkins, supra note 19, at 2277 & 
n.8. Sumption delivered the F.A. Mann Lecture in 2011, entitled Judicial and Political Decision-
Making: The Uncertain Boundary, in which he raised questions about the defensibility of “judicial 
resolution of inherently political issues,” presumably including questions of rights definition and 
recognition. See Jonathan Sumption, Q.C., F.A. Mann Lecture, Judicial and Political Decision-Making: 
The Uncertain Boundary 19 (Nov. 8, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.legalweek.com/digital_
assets/3704/MANNLECTURE_final.pdf ). 
188 Note, in this regard, that the U.S. Supreme Court first established the Court’s power of judicial 
review over Acts of Congress in 1803, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), but this 
horizontal judicial review was contentious and debated well into the twentieth century. See CHARLES 
GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 1–19 (2d ed. rev. ed. 1959). 
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A. Boundary Disputes 
Dividing or sharing power is often an exercise in line drawing: the 
principle of the distribution of powers requires determining when bounded 
limits are breached. And “any division of legislative power will raise 
certain fundamental issues which must be resolved by the courts and which 
will shape the entire nature of that division of authority.”189 Whether power 
is devolved over time or divided ab initio, “the judicial task of determining 
legislative competence is, in conceptual terms, essentially the same in both. 
Judges must identify the subject matter of the impugned statute, and then 
determine whether it falls within or outside the subject matters over which 
the legislature has authority.”190 The central court thus takes on the role of 
an impartial arbiter: “independent of both the [national] and the 
[subnational] governments . . . stand[ing] sublimely above both.”191 Under 
the terms of the devolutionary settlement in the United Kingdom, the 
Supreme Court stands only above the devolved legislatures, not 
Parliament—but it has jurisdiction to monitor the division of competences 
enacted in the devolution acts.192 How the Court chooses to exercise this 
power will affect its own position in the constitutional order and the ways 
that order can be considered to reflect a version of legal constitutionalism. 
Boundary disputes also occur in other contexts, beyond the realm of 
divided legislative powers. When there are multiple levels of protection 
over the same set of rights, for example, conflicting interpretations may 
raise questions about who holds the ultimate authority to determine the 
content and scope of a particular right.193 The relationship between the 
Westminster Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) demonstrates this tension in their face-off about rights definition 
and protection. In this context, power may accrue to the institution with the 
first-mover advantage, or that with sufficient enforcement mechanisms to 
impose its will. Given its institutional position as a court in dialogue with 
 
189 Craig & Walters, supra note 112, at 289. 
190 Id. at 288. 
191 IVO D. DUCHACEK, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF POLITICS 
256 (1970). On the need for a federal system to incorporate some sort of impartial agency, see id. at 
207–08. See also S. RUFUS DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE: A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME IN QUEST OF 
A MEANING 122 (1978); URSULA K. HICKS, FEDERALISM: FAILURE AND SUCCESS 7 (1978); WILLIAM 
S. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 10–11 (1956); P.-J. PROUDHON, THE 
PRINCIPLE OF FEDERATION 41 (Richard Vernon trans., 1979) (1863); GEOFFREY SAWER, MODERN 
FEDERALISM 1–2 (new ed. 1976); WHEARE, supra note 134, at 58–59. 
192 The devolutionary acts gave power to determine “devolutionary issues” to the judiciary (in the 
form of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council), and the Constitutional Reform Act shifted this 
jurisdiction to the new U.K. Supreme Court upon its creation. See supra Parts I.B–II.C. 
193 This concept raises issues similar to the Kompetenz–Kompetenz debate—the challenge of 
determining where the ultimate authority in a judicial system lies. Cf. Erin Delaney, Managing in a 
Federal System Without an ‘Ultimate Arbiter’: Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the EU and the Ante-bellum 
United States, 15 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 225 (2005). 
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the ECtHR,194 the Supreme Court may have some institutional advantages 
over Parliament in this dynamic, and by protecting national interests, the 
Court may promote its own institutional position within the constitutional 
system. 
This section treats each of the above issues in turn, assessing the 
Court’s actions to determine the impact of these boundary disputes on the 
evolving relationship between the judiciary and Parliament. In other words, 
how might the Court’s vertical relationships—with Scotland below and the 
European Court of Human Rights above—affect its horizontal relationship 
with Parliament? This section argues that the Court’s position within this 
multilevel framework provides opportunities for accruing institutional 
power, even at the expense of Parliament. 
1. The United Kingdom v. Scotland: Devolution Issues.—The 
hierarchical relationship between the Supreme Court and Scotland engages 
a number of potential theories, drawn from social science literature, about 
the possible effects of that dynamic on the relationship between the Court 
and the Westminster Parliament. In this subsection, the focus is on the 
division of competences provided for in the Scotland Act (1998) and those 
cases before the Court that raise questions of statutory interpretation. Prior 
to the creation of the Court in 2009, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council had heard only six cases related to the legislative competence of 
the Scottish Parliament, all of which challenged the relevant acts of that 
body on the basis of incompatibility with the Convention.195 The ability to 
attack Scottish legislative or executive action on human rights grounds 
raises questions about the uniformity of national rights, an issue which will 
be addressed further below. Regarding clear division-of-competences cases 
raising questions of statutory interpretation, the Court has heard only three 
cases raising non-Convention and non-European Union law-based 
devolution issues—two of the cases related to Scotland, and one to 
Wales.196 Two theories connect these vertical cases to the horizontal 
relationship between the Court and Parliament, and they will be treated in 
turn: first, concurrent legislative authority and second, doctrinal 
entanglement. 
 
194 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
195 See Procurator Fiscal v. Brown, [2000] UKPC D3, [2003] 1 A.C. 681 (appeal taken from Scot.); 
HM Advocate v. McIntosh, [2001] UKPC D1, [2003] 1 A.C. 1078 (appeal taken from Scot.); McLean 
v. Procurator Fiscal, [2001] UKPC D3, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2425 (appeal taken from Scot.); Anderson v. 
The Scottish Ministers, [2001] UKPC D5, [2003] 2 A.C. 602 (appeal taken from Scot.); Flynn v. HM 
Advocate, [2004] UKPC D1, [2004] S.C. (P.C.) 1 (appeal taken from Scot.); DS v. HM Advocate, 
[2007] UKPC D1, [2007] S.C. (P.C.) 1 (appeal taken from Scot.). 
196 Martin v. HM Advocate, [2010] UKSC 10, [2010] S.C. 40 (appeal taken from Scot.); Axa Gen. 
Ins. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C. 868 (appeal taken from Scot.); Local Gov’t 
Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012—Reference by the Attorney Gen. for Eng. & Wales, [2012] UKSC 53, 
Attorney Gen. v. Nat’l Assembly for Wales Comm’n [2013] 1 A.C. 792. 
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a. Concurrent legislative authority.—The first theory suggests 
that where there is concurrent legislative authority in a federal or quasi-
federal system, there will be much litigation and tension, and a court may 
be able to enhance the powers of the subnational legislature (here, 
Holyrood) at the expense of the national legislature (here, Westminster).197 
In certain circumstances, such a decision to empower the subnational 
legislature might serve to increase the power and relevance of the court in 
its horizontal relationships. For example, suppose the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Scotland Act to grant Holyrood power to legislate on an 
issue of particular political salience to Scotland. The Westminster 
Parliament might disagree with such a reading, but nevertheless choose to 
acquiesce to the Supreme Court’s allocation of competences for reasons of 
political expediency.198 Such acquiescence can, over time, shift into a 
powerful convention supporting judicial power.199 Thus, due to judicial 
decisions empowering the subnational legislature, power may ebb from the 
national legislature and flow to the central court. 
The first case to reach the Supreme Court that raised a non-
Convention-related devolution issue was not one of pressing political 
salience; nevertheless, it introduced a critical set of concerns and 
approaches to the question of Scottish power, including an oblique 
reference to the theory of concurrent legislative authority. In Martin v. HM 
Advocate, decided in 2010, the Supreme Court identified a question of 
overlapping competences. Martin presented a challenge to the Criminal 
Proceedings Act (Scotland) 2007, which increased the sentence for 
unlicensed driving that the Westminster Parliament had set in its Road 
Traffic Offenders Act of 1988.200 The Scottish High Court of Justiciary 
determined in a previous case, Logan v. Harrower, that the Scottish 
Parliament was within its legislative competence to increase this 
sentence.201 If the Supreme Court concluded that the Scottish Act related to 
a matter reserved to Westminster, the Act would be considered ultra vires 
and void. 
The Court split three to two—upholding the Act as within the 
devolved competence of the Scottish Parliament but relying on distinct 
 
197 See Craig & Walters, supra note 112, at 299–302 (discussing Canada and Australia). 
198 BOGDANOR, supra note 7, at 115 (“Were the Supreme Court to rule, in a particular dispute, that 
the Scottish Parliament was acting intra vires, it would be difficult, in practice, for Westminster to 
override it either by using its sovereignty to legislate for Scottish domestic affairs, or by altering the 
distribution of powers. If it did, Parliament would appear to be flouting the judgment of a court on an 
issue on which Scottish national sentiment might well be engaged.”). 
199 Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, passim. 
200 Martin, [2010] UKSC at [6]. 
201 Id. at [4] (Lord Hope) (citation omitted) (“Logan v. Harrower was the first case that brought the 
extent of the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament under judicial scrutiny on grounds other 
than compliance with Convention rights.”). 
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rationales to reach that conclusion.202 In his opinion aligned with the 
majority (for which the Justices wrote seriatim), Lord Hope relied on the 
quasi-federal role of the Privy Council in its interactions with 
Commonwealth countries to inform the Supreme Court’s approach to 
interpreting the Scotland Act. He recognized that “it was not possible, if a 
workable system was to be created, for reserved and devolved areas to be 
divided into precisely defined, watertight compartments. Some degree of 
overlap was inevitable . . . . This is a familiar phenomenon in the case of 
federal systems such as those in Canada and Australia . . . .”203 Lord Hope 
went on to analyze the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s efforts to 
disentangle competences in cases affecting India, Canada, and Australia—
ascribing to the idea that whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament relates 
to a power reserved to Westminster should be informed by the Act’s 
purpose.204 The Canadian and Australian systems are key examples of the 
concurrent competence theory, but the lack of a unified methodology 
undermines the decision’s potential to serve as a model for future division-
of-competences cases. And Lord Walker, another member of the majority, 
expressly took a different approach. Lord Walker described the interpretive 
project as “different from defining the division of legislative power 
between one federal legislature and several provincial or state legislatures 
(as in Canada or Australia . . .),” because “Parliament established the 
Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive and undertook the 
challenging task of defining the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament, while itself continuing as the sovereign legislature of the 
United Kingdom.”205 
Martin was the new Court’s first opportunity to discuss the division of 
competences, and it explained why so few cases had arisen. In the Court’s 
view—and contrary to conventional federal theory that tensions over power 
allocation engender high levels of litigation—two key elements of the 
British system kept issues from coming to the Court. First, until May 2007, 
there was “harmony” between governments at Westminster and 
Holyrood—in other words, both governments were Labour Party 
governments.206 Second, there had been ample use of legislative consent 
motions,207 the procedural instantiation of the Sewel Convention, allowing 
the Scottish Parliament to register its consent (or dissent) on a proposed 
 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at [11] (Lord Hope). 
204 Id. at [11]–[18]. 
205 Id. at [44] (Lord Walker). 
206 Id. at [4] (Lord Hope). 
207 On the Sewel Convention, see supra note 117. See also Sewel Convention Background, 
SCOTTISH GOV’T, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/Sewel/Background (last visited Mar. 
23, 2014); The Sewel Convention: Key Features, SCOTTISH GOV’T, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/
Government/Sewel/KeyFacts (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
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action of Westminster affecting Scottish interests.208 As the Martin case 
demonstrates, these elements of the political settlement on devolution have 
begun to break down. Political tensions between Holyrood and 
Westminster have increased since the 2007 elections in Scotland: the 
Scottish National Party, advocating Scottish independence, became the 
largest party in the Scottish Parliament after the 2007 elections, and the 
pressure for a referendum on Scottish independence is the most obvious 
example of diverging political interests between the leaders at Holyrood 
and those at Westminster.209 
The most recent indication that the number of pure division-of-
competences cases may be increasing comes from Wales. The Welsh 
Assembly’s power was expanded in 2006, and the Assembly may now pass 
primary legislation in a number of areas.210 The very first bill passed by the 
Welsh Assembly under its expanded power—the Local Government 
Byelaws (Wales) Bill (2012)—was challenged as outside the Assembly’s 
legislative competence by the Attorney General.211 This challenge raised 
express questions of concurrent power, and the Court found the Bill to be 
within the Welsh Assembly’s power to enact. Although the U.K. 
government brought suit, there was little interest in the case in the 
Westminster Parliament: the local government issues at stake did not 
present a threat.212 It remains to be seen if litigation, rather than political 
 
208 According to the Devolution Guidance, consent is “needed” in areas specifically devolved to 
Scotland, but the entire mechanism is political, and not a legally enforceable provision. For a list of the 
many consent motions considered by the Scottish Parliament, see Sewel Convention—Legislative 
Consent Motions, SCOTTISH GOV’T, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/Sewel (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014). 
209 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Patrick Wintour, SNP Wins Historic Victory, 
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2007, 2:37 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/04/scotland.devolution. 
210 The Welsh Assembly does not yet have as broad a scope of power as that granted to the Scottish 
Parliament, but its ability to pass primary legislation is an important step. Proposals are being discussed 
to grant the Assembly further power, including taxing powers, through the ongoing commission on 
devolution in Wales. See COMMISSION ON DEVOLUTION IN WALES, http://commissionondevolutionin
wales.independent.gov.uk (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
211 Local Gov’t Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012—Reference by the Attorney Gen. for Eng. & Wales, 
[2012] UKSC 53, [73], Attorney Gen. v. Nat’l Assembly for Wales Comm’n, [2013] 1 A.C. 792, [73] 
(Lord Hope). 
212 The U.K. government referred the Bill to the Supreme Court in late July 2012—during 
Parliamentary recess. See Attorney General in Court Challenge to First Welsh Bill, BBC NEWS (July 
31, 2012, 5:10 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-19055404. The first discussion of 
this decision in the House of Commons was on October 17, 2012, at which point the Secretary of State 
for Wales explained that “[t]he reference . . . of the first Welsh Bill . . . to the Supreme Court should not 
be regarded as disrespectful or hostile in any sense. It is simply an administrative procedure to clear up 
the issue of competence and that is it.” 551 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2012) 303–04 (U.K.) (David 
Jones). The only other discussion of the Bill occurred recently, when the costs of bringing the case to 
the Court (£62,500) were published. See 568 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2013) 707 (U.K.); Letter from 
Rt. Hon. David Jones, Sec’y of State for Wales, to David T.C. Davies, Chair, Welsh Affairs Comm., 
House of Commons (Oct. 8, 2013), www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/welsh-
affairs/2013_10_08.pdf!docid=1568185!.pdf (concerning the Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill). 
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negotiation, will become the more dominant approach to testing the 
boundary lines among these quasi-federalist institutions. If it does, and if 
the Court continues to uphold the power of the devolved legislatures, there 
may yet be an occasion, in an issue of high political salience, to test 
Westminster’s resolve in the face of a contrary position by the Court and a 
subnational legislature. 
b. Doctrinal entanglement.—The second federalism-based 
theory of empowerment rests on the concept of doctrinal elaboration. In 
some areas of law, it can be difficult to maintain a principled distinction 
between the powers of the national and subnational levels to burden rights. 
If, for example, one has a protected individual right to economic liberty, on 
what grounds can the national legislature, but not the subnational 
legislatures, burden that right?213 A court’s decision to articulate doctrine to 
limit the subnational legislature may in turn entangle the national 
legislature.214 The potential for such enmeshment exists in the British 
context: in AXA General Insurance Ltd. v. HM Lord Advocate,215 the Court 
expressly addressed an important matter of judicial power vis-à-vis 
Scotland in terms broad enough to have ramifications on the Court’s 
horizontal relationship with Westminster. 
AXA dealt with the ongoing challenges posed by asbestos litigation in 
the United Kingdom. One major issue in all asbestos litigation is causation: 
the connection between pleural plaques or pleural thickening in the lungs 
and the disease asbestosis. In 2008, before the creation of the Supreme 
Court, the Law Lords decided Rothwell v. Chemical & Insulating Co., in 
which, as a matter of English and Welsh law, they concluded that the mere 
presence of asymptomatic pleural plaques or pleural thickening “did not 
constitute an injury which was capable of giving rise to a claim for 
damages.”216 The decision was not binding on the Scottish courts, but “[i]t 
was anticipated that . . . it would almost certainly be followed in Scotland 
as there is no material difference between the law of England and Wales 
and Scots law on this branch of the law.”217 After the decision, the 
Westminster Parliament declined to legislate on the issue.218 By virtue of 
Rothwell, insurance companies for the asbestos industry and related 
companies were insulated from these types of damages claims. 
 
213 See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 12, at 1166–72 (discussing the liberty right to contract and 
how its elaboration in the subnational context weakened the arguments against applying the right as a 
limitation to government action in the national context). 
214 See id. 
215 [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C. 868 (appeal taken from Scot.). 
216 Id. at [2] (Lord Hope) (discussing Rothwell, [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 A.C. 281 (appeal taken 
from Eng.)). 
217 AXA, [2011] UKSC at [2] (Lord Hope). 
218 Id. at [14]. 
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One year after Rothwell, the Scottish Parliament passed the Damages 
(Asbestos-Related Conditions) (Scotland) Act.219 In direct contradiction to 
the Law Lords, the Act redefined the conditions that “shall constitute, and 
shall be treated as always having constituted, actionable harm” in asbestos 
cases to include these asymptomatic conditions.220 Exposed to massive risk, 
a number of major insurance companies sought a declaration that the 2009 
Act was unlawful. The ensuing case, AXA, presented critical questions of 
devolved power and included respondents from Scotland and the U.K. 
government, as well as intervenors from Northern Ireland and Wales.221 
In AXA, the appellants challenged the Damages Act as outside the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament arguing, inter alia, that “it is open to 
judicial review on common law grounds as an unreasonable, irrational and 
arbitrary exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Scotland Act 
1998.”222 Though ultimately finding the Act to be within the Scottish 
Parliament’s competence, Lord Hope recognized that: 
[T]he question as to whether Acts of the Scottish Parliament . . . are amenable 
to judicial review, and if so on what grounds, is a matter of very great 
constitutional importance. It goes to the root of the relationship between the 
democratically elected legislatures and the judiciary. At issue is the part which 
the rule of law itself has to play in setting the boundaries of this 
relationship.223 
Lord Hope first addressed whether the Scottish statute was amenable 
to judicial review on grounds other than those provided for in the Scotland 
Act 1998 itself. In doing so, he reaffirmed the Scottish Parliament’s place 
“as a self-standing democratically elected legislature” but noted, “it does 
not enjoy the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament that . . . is the 
bedrock of the British constitution.”224 Because the Scottish Parliament is a 
legislature of devolved powers,225 “the rule of law does not have to compete 
with the principle of sovereignty.”226 The task of assessing the possibility of 
judicial review under the common law is therefore made “much easier.”227 
Lord Hope drew on Lord Hailsham’s arguments in The Dilemma of 
Democracy about the potential danger to the rule of law of a powerful 
 
219 Damages (Asbestos-Related Conditions) (Scotland) Act, 2009, (A.S.P. 4); see also AXA, [2011] 
UKSC at [1] (describing insurance companies’ challenge to this Act). 
220 AXA, [2011] UKSC at [1]–[2] (Lord Hope) (citing Damages (Asbestos-Related Conditions) 
(Scotland) Act, 2009, (A.S.P. 4)). The Act is reproduced in relevant parts in AXA, [2011] UKSC at [13] 
(Lord Hope). 
221 AXA, [2011] UKSC at [4] (Lord Hope). 
222 Id. at [17] (Lord Hope). 
223 Id. at [42] (Lord Hope). 
224 Id. at [46]. 
225 See supra Part II.B. 
226 AXA, [2011] UKSC at [51]. 
227 Id. 
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government supported by a large majority in parliament.228 He noted that 
the Scottish government is supported by a majority that dominates the 
single-chamber Parliament and the various committees that scrutinize bills. 
He found it 
not entirely unthinkable that a government which has that power may seek to 
use it to abolish judicial review or to diminish the role of the courts in 
protecting the interests of the individual. Whether this is likely to happen is 
not the point. It is enough that it might conceivably do so. The rule of law 
requires that the judges must retain the power to insist that legislation of that 
extreme kind is not law which the courts will recognise.229 
Lord Hope was quick to distinguish the Scottish Parliament from 
Westminster based on Holyrood’s lack of sovereign power, and he asserted 
that the Court’s experience with the U.K. Parliament shed little light on 
how it should approach the Scottish question. He noted “as a challenge to 
primary legislation at common law was simply impossible while the only 
legislature was the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom at 
Westminster, we are in this case in uncharted territory.”230 Lord Hope 
ultimately reserved the question about “the relationship between the rule of 
law and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament,”231 but his 
justifications for review over the Scottish Parliament will be difficult to 
limit to the devolutionary context. 
The prudential and jurisprudential arguments presented in favor of 
judicial review and the dangers of unchecked democracy are as applicable 
to Westminster as to Holyrood. Dramatic government majorities in 
Westminster might present similar threats, and Lord Hope acknowledged 
that these issues had been raised in the 2006 case Jackson v. HM Attorney 
General.232 There, Lord Steyn had noted a steady increase in governmental 
power since Lord Hailsham first proposed the dilemma, and Steyn raised 
the possibility that “the Supreme Court might have to consider whether 
judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts was a constitutional 
fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a 
complaisant House of Commons could not abolish.”233 
That the Supreme Court was willing to establish a principle of judicial 
review over the Scottish Parliament grounded in the rule of law and rights 
protection does not mean that it will apply the same rule to Westminster. 
However, it is possible to observe in this case the elements that might make 
possible the transfer of the Court’s vertical power over Scotland to 
 
228 Id. at [50] (citing LORD HAILSHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY 126 (1978)). 
229 AXA, [2011] UKSC at [51] (Lord Hope). 
230 Id. at [48]. 
231 Id. at [51]. 
232 See id. at [50] (citing Jackson v. HM Attorney Gen., [2005] UKHL 56, R (Jackson) v. Attorney 
Gen., [2006] 1 A.C. 262 [102]). 
233 Id. (citing Jackson, [2005] UKHL at [120]). 
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horizontal judicial power usable against Westminster: a theoretically 
grounded justification for action that does not easily admit of distinctions 
between the two legislative institutions based on federalism grounds. Will 
the Supreme Court find occasion to make a grander statement? Or choose 
to precipitate a possible confrontation with Westminster? It may be 
unlikely, but should the Court contemplate such a move, the doctrinal 
support may come from AXA and the vertical definition of judicial power. 
2. The United Kingdom v. Europe: Fundamental Rights.—Unlike the 
devolutionary setting, in the context of the European rights system, 
structured around the European Convention on Human Rights, Westminster 
has no competing parliament—rather, it (and the government in office) 
compete with a higher court. The ECtHR has interpretive authority over the 
Convention, and if it finds the United Kingdom to be in breach of the 
Convention, the United Kingdom must either comply with the ECtHR’s 
judgment (often by passing new legislation) or be subject to ongoing 
oversight by the Council of Europe.234 The Westminster Parliament thus has 
limited ability to contradict the ECtHR or to proffer an alternative approach 
to rights definition. The government and parliamentarians are often put into 
a politically untenable position, exacerbated by the growing frustration 
with Europe and European “dictates.”235 They have no ability to negotiate 
or recalibrate the rights definition provided by the ECtHR, leaving them 
with an all-or-nothing political decision: either they remain in breach of the 
 
234 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 32, 46, Nov. 4, 
1950, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, as supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 155–65 (2006) (discussing oversight 
procedures of the Committee of Ministers at the Council of Europe). 
235 Frustration with Strasbourg has led politicians to advocate exiting the Convention system. See, 
e.g., Danny Nicol, The Human Rights Act and the Politicians, 24 LEGAL STUD. 451, 473 (2004) 
(discussing Michael Heseltine’s—then-Deputy Prime Minister—response to McCann v. United 
Kingdom). In 2011, a Commission on a Bill of Rights was established and charged with investigating 
the creation of the British Bill of Rights in response to controversial rulings from the ECtHR. See 
1 COMM’N ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, A UK BILL OF RIGHTS? THE CHOICE BEFORE US 3, 5 (2012), 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr/uk-bill-rights-vol-1.pdf. The Commission was 
comprised of nine legal experts from various political parties, and consulted widely in formulating its 
opinions. Ultimately, the Commission was unable to reach a consensus and disbanded after submitting a 
final report on December 18, 2012. See id. at 28–33. Two Conservative members of the Commission 
recommended withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights while Liberal Democrats 
and Labour Party members opposed the creation of a U.K. Bill of Rights altogether and stressed the 
need for the United Kingdom to remain in the European Convention system. See Owen Bowcott, UK 
Bill of Rights Commission Fails to Reach Consensus, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2012, 7:52 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/dec/18/uk-bill-of-rights-commission. A Bill of Rights was never 
adopted. The Commission on a Bill of Rights’ Report—A UK Bill of Rights?—The Choice Before Us, 
JUSTICE (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/cbr/the-commission-on-a-bill-
of-rights-report-a-uk-bill-of-rights-the-choice-before-us. 
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Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR, or they pass conforming 
legislation that may be widely opposed by the electorate.236 
The HRA inserts the U.K. Supreme Court between Parliament and the 
ECtHR, changing the dynamic of rights definition and demonstrating the 
importance and prominence of the Court’s role. If devolution placed the 
U.K. Supreme Court at the apex of the quasi-federal system, the HRA has 
turned the Court into something more akin to a lower state court in a 
federal system—subject to review by a higher court (the ECtHR), but also 
 
236 A recent example demonstrates how the nature of this judicial process strains the relationship 
between Parliament and the ECtHR. In 2005, the ECtHR found the United Kingdom in violation of the 
Convention due to its blanket denial of voting rights to prisoners; the ECtHR demanded that the United 
Kingdom take action to remedy the situation. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 187. In response, the British government initiated a public consultation on the question; no 
legislation was initiated. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers adopted a series of 
resolutions chiding the U.K. for failing to comply with the Court’s decision. See ISOBEL WHITE, HOUSE 
OF COMMONS LIBRARY, PRISONERS’ VOTING RIGHTS 21–22 (2014), www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/sn01764.pdf . And the Court continued to issue rulings against the United Kingdom. See Greens 
& M.T. v United Kingdom, App. Nos. 60041/08 & 60054/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 710 (2011). In early 
2011, the House of Commons voted, 234 to 22, in favor of maintaining the ban, 523 PARL. DEB., H.C. 
(6th ser.) (2011) 493–586 (U.K.), and in May 2012, the European Court gave Britain a final six-month 
extension in which to comply. WHITE, supra, at 40 . Late in 2012, the Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) 
Draft Bill was introduced to address the incompatibility and a Joint Select Committee was appointed to 
conduct prelegislative analysis of the proposed bill. Id. at 44–45 . Opinion polls, however, showed the 
British public to be strongly opposed to any change in the law. Not surprisingly, given the political 
sentiment on the issue, Prime Minister David Cameron has vocalized his distaste for the measures, even 
as his government proposes them. See Ashley Byrne, UK Mulls Ruling over Prisoner Voting Rights, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://dw.de/p/17QlD. The Justice Secretary, in discussing the 
proposed legislation, has said that MPs could decide to “legislate contrary to fundamental principles of 
human rights,” but that there may be a “political cost.” See MPs Can Force UK to Keep Ban on 
Prisoner Votes—Minister, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-20431995. The Joint Select Committee recognized, should the U.K. fail to comply, that the 
potential liability could reach £3.5 million, see JOINT COMM. ON THE DRAFT VOTING ELIGIBILITY 
(PRISONERS) BILL, DRAFT VOTING ELIGIBILITY (PRISONERS) BILL, 2013–14, H.L. 103, H.C. 924, ¶ 103 
(U.K.), www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtdraftvoting/103/103.pdf, and the obvious 
solution would be to leave the Convention system, see id. ¶ 107. Consistent with my argument above, it 
may be that the U.K. Supreme Court’s ability to participate in these debates—even now, after the initial 
violation—may provide some benefits. In parallel to these events, two prisoners—Chester and 
McGeoch—brought suit in domestic U.K. courts challenging the ban on voting. These cases were heard 
by the U.K. Supreme Court in June 2013, and an opinion was issued in October 2013. R (on the 
application of Chester) v. Sec’y of State for Justice & McGeoch v. Lord President of the Council & 
Another (Scotland), [2013] UKSC 63. Chester’s claim raised the Article 3 issues implicated by Hirst. In 
dismissing the cases, Lord Mance confronted the tension between the U.K. and the ECtHR, recognizing 
(though refusing to declare in this instance) that an incompatibility existed. Id. at [39]. Rather, Mance 
spent a considerable time demonstrating how a ban on Chester’s ability to vote could be reconciled with 
the developing case law of the European Court, focusing on sentence length. Id. at [41]–[42]. In its final 
report on December 18, 2013, the Joint Select Committee reiterated these themes, and recommended 
limited changes to the current ban, allowing “prisoners serving sentences of 12 months or less . . . to 
vote in all UK parliamentary, local and European elections.” See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra, ¶¶ 236, 239. 
For a discussion of the tension between parliamentary sovereignty and judicial protection of rights in 
the context of prisoners’ voting rights, see Janet L. Hiebert, The Human Rights Act: Ambiguity About 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, 14 GERMAN L.J. 2253 (2013). 
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responsible for articulating and protecting unique and distinct law. How 
might this new dynamic affect the relationship between the Supreme Court 
and Parliament itself? In comparative context, the history of the early 
United States demonstrates occasions of interbranch collaboration to 
promote central-level power at the expense of the individual states, and the 
political support given to the U.S. Supreme Court in such situations served 
to enhance its power and prestige.237 A British version of this story suggests 
that Parliament might look toward the new U.K. Supreme Court to mediate 
its relationship with the ECtHR. If so—and if the Court and Parliament do 
band together in defense of British preferences—will Parliament then find 
itself constrained by, or choose to acquiesce in, the Court’s decisions in 
other areas? Furthermore, might Parliament prefer to allow the Court to 
mediate the relationship with Europe? 
There is some indication that the Blair government may have seen a 
benefit in allowing national courts to interpret the Convention through the 
HRA. In its advocacy for the HRA, a major tenet of the approach was to 
“bring rights home” by giving authority to British courts to articulate 
British rights.238 A court has certain institutional advantages over a 
legislature or executive in this context.239 First, a court has the ability to 
interact with the ECtHR ex ante, before a claim has been lodged with the 
ECtHR, whereas the British government can only defend the U.K.’s 
position during litigation, and Parliament can only respond ex post, after a 
decision by the ECtHR has been made. Prior to the HRA, British courts 
could not hear or opine on Convention-based claims. Now that such claims 
are available, a litigant exhausts her national remedies in British court prior 
to bringing a petition before the ECtHR.240 This gives a national court the 
opportunity to explain and distinguish the nature of the British practice at 
issue in the context of a reasoned judicial opinion—a form and manner that 
the ECtHR will both understand and be expected to address or take into 
account.241 
 
237 See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 12, at 1149–57 (discussing early growth of the vertical 
power of the Supreme Court due to the willingness of the President to support the Court against the 
states); cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 9 (discussing acquiescence as contributing to the power of 
the Supreme Court, and noting that “[j]udicial supremacy itself rests on political foundations. The 
judiciary may assert its own supremacy over constitutional interpretation, but such claims ultimately 
must be supported by other political actors . . . .”). 
238  RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 69, at 6 (“British judges will be enabled to make a 
distinctively British contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of human rights in Europe.”). 
239 Cf. CROWE, supra note 13, at 12 (footnote omitted) (noting political actors’ “recognition of 
performance benefits unique to judicial governance (the application of uniform and consistent rules 
across agencies or states, the information advantage in assessing the concrete effects of policy afforded 
by being an ex post mover)”). 
240 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
241 Cf. Jeroen Schokkenbroek, Judicial Review by the European Court of Human Rights: 
Constitutionalism at European Level, in JUDICIAL CONTROL 153, 158 (Rob Bakker et al. eds., 1995) 
(noting influence of legal reasoning at the national level on the ECtHR). 
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Beyond the potential for judicial dialogue, political benefits might also 
accrue to Parliament by its allowing courts to take the lead on rights 
definition. In addition to the HRA’s potential for protecting British 
interests, it also, and perhaps contradictorily, required British courts to take 
judgments of the ECtHR “into account” when defining rights.242 What 
advantages to Parliament might this present? If the British courts do not 
distinguish rights as uniquely British, and seek instead to achieve 
conformity with European law, it may be through the articulation and 
development of the common law that these rights affect individuals. 
Politicians would not have to pass unpopular legislation in order to 
vindicate Convention rights. This exact type of legislative acquiescence 
and political calculation has been one driver in the increase of judicial 
power over time.243 
Whether the Blair government or parliamentarians more generally saw 
clearly the potential political benefits from the adoption of the HRA, early 
signs suggest that the relationship is playing out to Parliament’s advantage. 
This section will address two such indications: the Court has successfully 
negotiated with the ECtHR in order to define and protect rights in ways that 
better reflect British interests in the context of hearsay evidence; and in 
otherwise enforcing the Convention’s protection of privacy, the Court has 
drawn political poison away from Parliament, a fact noted by at least one 
member of the House of Lords.244 It remains to be seen whether 
Parliament’s reliance on the Court might in turn result in the Court’s 
continued empowerment, towards gaining the “final say” over rights 
definition within Britain. 
a. Protecting hearsay.—The question of inter-institutional 
dialogue is presented most clearly in the history of the 2011 case, Al-
Khawaja v. United Kingdom.245 Mr. Imad Al-Khawaja, a British national, 
was arrested and “charged on two counts of indecent assault.”246 One of his 
alleged victims gave a statement to police after the assault but committed 
suicide before trial. The trial judge admitted this alleged victim’s statement 
to the jury—without the statement, the indictment on the first count of 
assault could not have been sustained. Ultimately, Al-Khawaja was 
convicted of “both counts of indecent assault.”247 On appeal, Al-Khawaja 
 
242 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 2 (U.K.). 
243 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, passim (focusing on executive acquiescence); Paul Frymer, 
Acting when Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor 
Unions, 1935–85, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483, 495 (2003); Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, 
supra note 12, at 41. 
244 See 727 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2011) 1493–94 (U.K.) (Lord Irvine). 
245 App. Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 807, para. 147 (2011). 
246 Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
1, 4 (2009). 
247 Id. at 5. 
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challenged the evidentiary ruling admitting the statement, but his 
conviction was sustained. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s 
actions did not violate Article 6(1) or (3)(d) of the Convention protecting 
the right to a fair trial;248 in so concluding, the appeals court looked to 
ECtHR rulings suggesting that the question is “whether the proceedings as 
a whole, including the way the evidence was taken, were fair.”249 Under 
that standard, the court determined that admission of the dead woman’s 
testimony was acceptable. The Appellate Committee of the House of 
Lords, then the U.K.’s highest appeals court, declined review.250 
Al-Khawaja petitioned the ECtHR, alleging a violation of the 
Convention. The Chamber of the ECtHR to which the case was assigned 
did not accept the United Kingdom’s position that counterbalancing factors 
weighed in favor of admitting the testimony. The Chamber relied on a 2001 
case, Lucà v. Italy,251 in which the ECtHR held: 
[W]here a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions 
that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to 
examine or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, 
the rights of the defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with 
the guarantees provided by Article 6.252 
The United Kingdom appealed to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR.253 
Before the Grand Chamber was scheduled to hear the United 
Kingdom’s appeal in Al-Khawaja, the U.K. Supreme Court decided R v. 
Horncastle.254 Horncastle was convicted of causing serious bodily harm, 
with intent, to Peter Rice. Rice made a statement to police about his injuries 
but died before trial from other causes. The statement was admitted at trial 
and was “to a decisive degree” the basis of the conviction.255 The Court of 
Appeal dismissed Horncastle’s appeal, and he challenged his conviction at 
the Supreme Court on the ground that his trial violated Article 6 of the 
Convention.256 
 
248 See Convention, supra note 66, art. 6(1) (“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations 
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”); id. art. 6(3)(d) 
(“Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: . . . to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him . . . .”). 
249 Al-Khawaja, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 5 (quoting Doorson v. Netherlands, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 
446, 472). 
250 Id. at 6. 
251 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 178. 
252 Id. para. 40. 
253 The Grand Chamber, a panel of seventeen judges, may agree to hear important cases (usually 
referred to it by a Chamber) de novo. Convention Protocol No. 11, supra note 66, arts. 27, 43. 
254 [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 A.C. 373 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
255 Id. at [2]. 
256 Id. at [1]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 
588
The facts of Horncastle’s case mirrored those of Al-Khawaja’s, and 
Horncastle argued that the Supreme Court “should treat the judgment of the 
Chamber in Al-Khawaja as determinative of the success of [his] 
appeal[].”257 In support of his position, he cited HRA Section 2, which 
requires courts “to take into account” decisions of the ECtHR.258 A 
unanimous U.K. Supreme Court declined to follow the European ruling. As 
President of the Court, Lord Phillips wrote: 
There will . . . be rare occasions where this court has concerns as to whether a 
decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates 
particular aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to 
this court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for 
adopting this course. This is likely to give the Strasbourg Court the 
opportunity to reconsider the particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, 
so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue between 
this court and the Strasbourg Court. This is such a case.259 
Lord Phillips then detailed the ways in which domestic law protected 
the right to a fair trial, beginning with an explanation of the English 
criminal process and including the traditional hearsay rule at common law 
and those exceptions enacted by Parliament “in the interests of justice.”260 
He went on to provide details of hearsay exceptions in other common law 
jurisdictions, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.261 The 
decision then analyzed the ECtHR’s jurisprudence prior to Al-Khawaja,262 
noting that it too had acknowledged certain exceptions “to the strict 
application of article 6(3)(d).”263 It concluded that the “jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court in relation to article 6(3)(d) has developed largely in 
cases relating to civil law rather than common law jurisdictions and this is 
particularly true of the sole or decisive rule [relied upon in Al-Khawaja].”264 
Furthermore, this development occurred “without full consideration of the 
safeguards against an unfair trial that exist under the common law 
procedure,” or of the changes made to that law by Parliament expressly to 
ensure compliance with the Convention.265 In summation, Lord Philips 
attested: “I have taken careful account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. I 
hope that in due course the Strasbourg Court may also take account of the 
 
257 Id. at [10]. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at [11]. 
260 Id. at [14], [28]–[37]. 
261 Id. at [41] & Annexe 1. 
262 Id. at [63]–[86]. 
263 Id. at [64]. 
264 Id. at [107]. 
265 Id. 
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reasons that have led me not to apply the sole or decisive test in this 
case.”266 
The Supreme Court announced its decision in December 2009; in the 
spring of 2010, the Grand Chamber heard the United Kingdom’s appeal in 
Al-Khawaja. In its opinion issued in December 2011, the Grand Chamber 
modified its view, concluding, “[W]here a hearsay statement is the sole or 
decisive evidence against a defendant, its admission as evidence will not 
automatically result in a breach of [Article] 6(1).”267 Rather, it may be 
weighed against counterbalancing factors, “including measures that permit 
a fair and proper assessment of [its] reliability.”268 In applying this test to 
Al-Khawaja’s factual circumstances, the Grand Chamber concluded that 
“there were sufficient counterbalancing factors” preventing a breach of the 
Convention.269 
The Horncastle litigation and the resulting inter-institutional dialogue 
were considered a great success of the Supreme Court. After the passage of 
the HRA, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords also had some 
measure of success in interacting with the ECtHR,270 but that court’s 
actions did not garner as much attention.271 It may be, therefore, that the 
 
266 Id. at [108]. 
267 Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 807, para. 
147 (2011) (Tulkens, J.). 
268 Id. 
269 Id. para. 158. In the second (joined) case, the ECtHR found for the petitioner, requiring the 
United Kingdom to pay “€18,000 (£15,000) in costs and damages.” See Owen Bowcott, European 
Court Backs British Judges over Hearsay Evidence, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2011, 7:46 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/dec/15/european-court-of-human-rights-ukcrime. 
270 The Lords’ decisions in R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions ex 
parte Holding & Barnes PLC, Alconbury Developments Ltd & Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd, 
[2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 A.C. 295 (“Alconbury”), and Begum (FC) v. London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets, [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 A.C. 430, addressing issues of Convention Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial) were adopted in part by the European Court of Human Rights in Tsfayo v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 60860/00, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 457, para. 45 (2009). See Sir Philip Sales, Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
and the Human Rights Act: A Response to Lord Irvine, 2012 P.L. 253, 265; see also Brenda Hale, 
Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 71–
73 (2012) (discussing cases in which the Lords went “further than Strasbourg,” including EM 
(Lebanon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] UKHL 64, [2009] 1 A.C. 1198; R v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Adam, Limbuela & Tesema, [2005] UKHL 66, 
[2006] 1 A.C. 396; In re P (Adoption: Unmarried Couple), [2008] UKHL 38, In re G (Adoption: 
Unmarried Couple), [2009] 1 A.C. 173; and cases in which the House of Lords took a “British line” 
when addressing “interference with a qualified Convention right,” including R (Countryside Alliance) v. 
HM Attorney General, [2007] UKHL 52, [2008] 1 A.C. 719). 
271 Another reason for the more limited focus on dialogic possibilities with the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords was that court’s decision in R v. Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah, 
[2004] UKHL 26, [2004] 2 A.C. 323. That case introduced what has become known as the “mirror 
principle”: that domestic courts should “in the absence of some special circumstances, follow any clear 
and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court.” Id. at [20] (Lord Bingham). This judicial approach 
has sustained criticism from Lord Irvine. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, A British Interpretation of 
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visibility of the stand-alone Supreme Court has had an effect on the public 
and parliamentary assessments of the Court’s actions. After Horncastle, the 
legal director for Liberty, a U.K.-based human rights advocacy group, 
highlighted the “importance of [the ECtHR’s] dialogue with our supreme 
court. . . . Without the Human Rights Act we’d have been left with the 
earlier inflexible judgment.”272 In addition, judges at both the national and 
European levels seemed pleased with the exchange. In his concurring 
opinion in Al-Khawaja, Sir Nicolas Bratza, a judge at the ECtHR, 
complimented the U.K. Supreme Court on “a good example” of judicial 
dialogue and suggested Horncastle influenced the decision to rehear Al-
Khawaja in the Grand Chamber.273 British judges have indicated that they 
will continue to take this aggressive role. As Lord Phillips said, “Whenever 
Strasbourg gives a judgment which, when we have to consider its impact, 
leads us to believe that perhaps they haven’t fully appreciated how things 
work in this country, we invite them to think again.”274 
b. The “European” right to privacy.—In contrast to Horncastle, 
in which the Supreme Court fought for a British understanding of the 
hearsay exception, the British courts have been more accepting of the 
European approach in the context of the right to privacy. In English law, 
privacy never achieved the status of a common law right.275 Protection 
rested instead on a mismatched set of common law doctrines, including, 
inter alia, libel, malicious falsehood, and trespass to the person.276 In 1991, 
after a particularly egregious case demonstrated the difficulty of protecting 
an individual’s privacy against the efforts of scoop-seeking journalists,277 a 
number of senior judges called on Parliament to take action to remedy the 
situation.278 Eventually, and in large part unrelated to these demands,279 
 
Convention Rights, 2012 P.L. 237; Tom Rainsbury, Their Lordships’ Timorous Souls, 1 U.C. LONDON 
HUM. RTS. REV. 32, 45 (2008). 
272 Bowcott, supra note 269. 
273 Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 807, 862, 
para. 2 (2012) (Bratza, J., concurring). 
274 Wesley Johnson, Judges Will Ask European Court ‘to Think Again,’ PRESS ASS’N NAT’L 
NEWSWIRE, July 29, 2010, available at Factiva, Doc. No. PRESSA0020100729e67t006mz. 
275 See Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62, 66 (“It is well-known that in English law there is no 
right to privacy, and accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person’s privacy.”) 
(Glidewell, L.J.). 
276 Id. 
277 In Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62, an actor, Gorden Kaye, was recovering in a hospital 
from severe head injuries sustained in a car accident. Despite notices of restricted access, two reporters 
from the tabloid newspaper Sunday Sport entered Kaye’s hospital room, took photographs, and 
conducted an interview to which Kaye was medically incapable of giving informed consent. The court 
denied Kaye’s claims for violation of privacy given the absence of any common law right to privacy in 
English law. Id. at 66, 70. 
278 See id. at 66 (“The facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of the desirability of 
Parliament considering whether and in what circumstances statutory provision can be made to protect 
the privacy of individuals.”) (Glidewell, L.J.); id. at 70 (“This case nonetheless highlights, yet again, the 
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Parliament enacted the Human Rights Act, which, following the terms of 
the Convention (Articles 10 and 8, respectively), protects both the freedom 
of expression (used to support a free press) and the right to respect for an 
individual’s private and family life.280 Soon after the passage of the HRA, 
and drawing on European case law, courts began to balance these two 
rights in favor of privacy.281 
At the time of the enactment of the HRA, there was some concern 
about the possible implications the introduction of a right to privacy might 
have on the British press—and, in particular, the powerful tabloid press.282 
Members of the Blair government assured the press that the HRA was not a 
threat.283 It may be that Blair and others believed this to be true, but Lord 
Judge Leggatt had identified the tension very clearly back in 1991: “We do 
not need a First Amendment to preserve the freedom of the press, but the 
abuse of that freedom can be ensured only by the enforcement of a right to 
privacy.”284 And the media recognized that the introduction of the 
protections in the HRA could lead to privacy protections through the “back 
door,”285 without the benefit of an open debate in Parliament focused on the 
privacy issue. 
It seems clear that parliamentarians were uninterested in having an 
open debate on the protection of privacy—and the concomitant limitations 
on the freedom of the press—perhaps because of the power of the press in 
the election cycles in Britain. As Mark Graber has argued in the American 
context, certain issues crosscut political parties; if neither party will achieve 
any electoral benefit by championing a position, it is to both parties’ benefit 
to allow the issue to be decided by the courts. In Graber’s model of judicial 
empowerment, the existence of a crosscutting issue indicates the possibility 
for delegation to the judiciary and eventual acquiescence in the judiciary’s 
 
failure of both the common law of England and statute to protect in an effective way the personal 
privacy of individual citizens.”) (Bingham, L.J.); id. at 71 (“This right [to privacy] has so long been 
disregarded here that it can be recognised now only by the legislature.”) (Leggatt, L.J.). 
279 See supra Part II.A. 
280 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.); Convention, supra note 66. 
281 See Campbell v. MGN, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 [2]–[8], [125] (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (holding Mirror Group liable for publishing photographs of supermodel Naomi Campbell 
leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, where publication constituted wrongful disclosure of private 
information in violation of Ms. Campbell’s right of privacy under Article 8 of the Convention, and 
where Mirror Group’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention did not 
outweigh Ms. Campbell’s privacy interest). 
282 See Les P. Carnegie, Note, Privacy and the Press: The Impact of Incorporating the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the United Kingdom, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 311, 338–40 (1998). 
283 See Michael White, No Back Door Privacy Laws, Pledges Blair, GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 1998, at 
8; James Landale & Frances Gibb, Rights Bill Is No Threat to Press, Irvine Insists, TIMES (London), 
Nov. 4, 1997, at 8. 
284 Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62, 71. 
285 See White, supra note 283. 
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determinations.286 Privacy law itself may not be a crosscutting issue, but 
angering the powerful media companies may have been equally undesirable 
for both the Labor and Conservative parties. The evolution of privacy law 
in the United Kingdom since the Human Rights Act suggests that this may 
be an area that parliamentarians were happy to delegate to the courts. And, 
in important ways, Parliament has acquiesced in much of what the courts 
have done. 
In 2010, British courts began to issue injunctions preventing the press 
from publishing details on the private lives of some of Britain’s A-list 
celebrities, as potential violations of the individuals’ Convention rights 
(justiciable through the HRA) to privacy. Some of these injunctions were 
“super” injunctions: not only did they prevent the press from publishing the 
dirt,287 they also forbade the publication of the fact of the injunction or the 
existence of the proceedings.288 Others were “anonymised”: the existence of 
proceedings could be acknowledged, but the names of the parties were to 
be kept secret.289 
These super-injunctions spurred a great deal of political controversy 
and backlash. Manchester United footballer Ryan Giggs was granted a 
super-injunction against the British tabloid, The Sun, and model Imogen 
Thomas, who had threatened to disclose an affair with Giggs.290 Many felt 
that privacy rights were going too far,291 and in the Giggs case, an 
individual parliamentarian used parliamentary privilege to blow the whistle 
on the super-injunction.292 The public—and the press—were outraged at the 
protections offered to Giggs.293 
 
286 Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 12, at 38. 
287 Cf. Boris Johnson, Leveson Report: Only a Gutter Press Can Keep Clean the Gutters of Public 
Life, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2013, 10:15 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/leveson-
inquiry/9936516/Leveson-report-Only-a-gutter-press-can-keep-clean-the-gutters-of-public-life.html 
(“[I]f you want to keep clean the gutters of public life, you need a gutter press.”). Johnson is the current 
Mayor of London. Mayor of London, GREATER LONDON AUTHORITY, http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor
-assembly/mayor (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
288 COMM. ON SUPER-INJUNCTIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SUPER-INJUNCTIONS iv (2011) 
[hereinafter NEUBERGER REPORT], http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/
super-injunction-report-20052011.pdf. 
289 Id. 
290 See Martin Beckford, Ryan Giggs Named in Court for First Time over Injunction, TELEGRAPH 
(Feb. 22, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/9096152/Ryan-
Giggs-named-in-court-for-first-time-over-injunction.html; Ryan Giggs: Timeline of Injunction Debate, 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/
9095887/Ryan-Giggs-timeline-of-injunction-debate.html. 
291 Mary Riddell, The Battle Between Parliament and the Judges Has Only Just Begun, 
TELEGRAPH (May 30, 2011, 7:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/maryriddell/
8546514/The-battle-between-Parliament-and-the-judges-has-only-just-begun.html (“Injunctions to 
protect footballers’ privacy have exposed the law to ridicule . . . .”). 
292 528 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2011) 638 (U.K.) (John Hemming); Steve Doughty, We Will 
Not Be Gagged, M’lud: As Ryan Giggs Is Named in Parliament as Cheating Star After Weeks of Legal 
Farce, MPs Launch a Defiant Message, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (May 24, 2011, 7:06 AM), 
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Prime Minister David Cameron responded to the controversy, pinning 
the blame squarely on the judges: 
What’s happening here is that the judges are using the European convention 
on human rights to deliver a sort of privacy law without [P]arliament saying 
so. . . . [W]e do need to have a proper sit back and think: is this right, is this 
the right thing to happen? The judges are creating a sort of privacy law, 
whereas what ought to happen in a parliamentary democracy is parliament—
which you elect and put there—should decide how much protection do we 
want for individuals and how much freedom of the press and the rest of it. . . . 
It might be odd to hear it, but I don’t really have the answer to this one, I need 
to do some more thinking about it.294 
One commentator expected a “battle” to emerge between Parliament and 
the judges.295 But Cameron did not advocate a quick legislative response by 
Parliament. Instead, a series of committees on privacy were convened. 
Both the 2011 Committee on Super-Injunctions and the 2012 Joint 
Committee on Privacy and Injunctions ultimately supported the judges. The 
2011 Committee, although discouraging their use, acknowledged that 
“super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions represent a new extension 
of established forms of anonymity, privacy and non-disclosure orders in 
that, they are used to protect substantive legal rights which have, in 
accordance with the HRA, developed beyond their previous historical 
limits.”296 And in debate in the House of Lords, Lord Black of Brentwood 
recognized that the courts were only doing their duty in interpreting the 
Human Rights Act.297 The 2012 Committee was created after it came to 
light that British newspapers were hacking the cell phones of celebrities to 
monitor their calls and voicemails. The Joint Committee on Privacy and 





293 Owen Bowcott, Privacy Law Should Be Made by MPs, Not Judges, Says David Cameron, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/apr/21/cameron-super
injunctions-parliament-should-decide-law (noting one description of press response as “[t]he 
newspapers have decided that the way to change policy is to shout about it from the rooftops”). 
294 Id. 
295 Riddell, supra note 291 (“Judges and politicians do not, and should not, always agree. The 
danger is that their differences, for which the catalyst is usually though not invariably human rights, 
become a power battle leading to constitutional meltdown.”). 
296 NEUBERGER REPORT, supra note 288, at 23. 
297 727 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2011) 1516 (U.K.) (Lord Black of Brentwood) (“It is not the 
courts that are responsible for the changing balance between privacy and freedom of expression; they 
are merely interpreting the law, which does not spring from some form of public policy ether but from 
the Human Rights Act and the manner in which it incorporated the European convention into our 
domestic law.”). 
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It is important that privacy injunctions are obtained in circumstances which 
justify the intervention of the law; injunctions should not be too freely or 
easily obtainable. [But w]e conclude that a privacy statute would not clarify 
the law. The concepts of privacy and the public interest are not set in stone, 
and evolve over time. We conclude that the current approach, where judges 
balance the evidence and make a judgment on a case-by-case basis, provides 
the best mechanism for balancing article 8 and article 10 rights.298 
The evolution of privacy law and the response of Parliament to the 
decisions of the judges suggest that parliamentarians have recognized the 
advantage of allowing judges to do some of the work in articulating and 
defining rights. Parliament appears willing to concede to the judges’ 
version of privacy law, as it might be difficult to protect privacy in a 
manner consistent with the Convention while also placating the British 
press. As Lord Irvine said in debate in the House of Lords: 
[T]he Government could introduce tomorrow a freedom of expression and 
privacy Bill compatibly with the convention if they took their courage in both 
hands. . . . [Given] the inevitable wrath of the tabloids . . . your Lordships 
should not be in the least surprised if no such legislation is ultimately brought 
forward. Far easier to go on berating the judges, however unfairly, for doing 
what Parliament has instructed them to do than to take the knock of legislation 
oneself.299 
For now, Parliament has acquiesced in the judiciary’s approach to 
privacy. But this type of relationship can shift from acquiescence to 
constraint. Parliament may find itself forced to accept other (less politically 
palatable) aspects of judicial decisionmaking in order to reinforce its 
position that the courts are best placed to address these types of questions. 
In this way, and over an uncertain length of time, judicial empowerment 
may grow to serve as a practical limitation on parliamentary sovereignty. 
B. Pressures for Uniformity 
Federalism creates variation.300 Multilevel governance systems, 
whether devolved or federal, are thought to encourage maximization of 
individuals’ preferences, as people can relocate to the constituent unit 
(state, province, etc.) that best reflects their desired bundle of goods and 
services.301 In addition, permitting decisions about societal goods to be 
 
298 JOINT COMM. ON PRIVACY & INJUNCTIONS, PRIVACY AND INJUNCTIONS, 2010–12, H.L. 273, 
H.C. 1443, at 4; see also id. at 15–16. 
299 727 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2011) 1494 (U.K.). 
300 See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 122–23; DUCHACEK, supra note 191, at 255–58; HICKS, supra 
note 191, at 7; D.J. KRIEK ET AL., FEDERALISM: THE SOLUTION? 7–8 (1992); LIVINGSTON, supra note 
191, at 10–11. 
301 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 423 
(1956) (“Policies that promote residential mobility and increase the knowledge of the consumer-voter 
will improve the allocation of government expenditures . . . .”); see also Himsworth, supra note 171, at 
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made as close as possible to the citizens affected allows for preferences and 
results to be better matched and can foster democratic involvement.302 But 
variation is rarely allowed full rein: the constituent units must retain some 
type of commonality in order to maintain the integrity of the state as a 
whole.303 If certain goods vary too widely, the cohesiveness of the state is 
threatened by the challenge of what in Britain is called the “post-code 
lottery”: people may come to believe that rights or benefits are unequally 
distributed, or are randomly provided based only on location, rather than on 
substantive theory or reasoned decisionmaking.304 In order to relieve this 
political pressure, there are often certain areas of law—usually rights 
provisions—that are uniform across the system, imposed by the highest 
level legislature. 
The Human Rights Act provides one of the few areas of nationwide 
law in the United Kingdom. Although not mentioned in the course of the 
law’s promulgation, “it must have been assumed, at least on the part of the 
UK government, that [the HRA] would maintain a broad uniformity of 
approach between the UK jurisdictions.”305 Variation is expressly 
discouraged: in the Scotland Act (1998), “certain ‘rights-related’ 
matters . . . are reserved [to Westminster],” and “the HRA itself may not be 
modified by the Scottish Parliament.”306 
Beyond the unifying aspects of a sole internal rights regime, the HRA 
as uniform law has additional import in light of its connection to the 
Convention. The Convention is part of a system that has taken on elements 
of a quasi-federal regime,307 but it is nevertheless an international treaty, 
 
40 (“[A] principal use of the division of the United Kingdom into ‘country’-based jurisdictions has been 
in the definition of the territorial scope of primary legislation.”). 
302 See Himsworth, supra note 171, at 31–32 (“Devolution has enhanced the capacity for difference 
and, more importantly, enhanced its democratic base.”). 
303 LIVINGSTON, supra note 191, at 310. 
304 Himsworth, supra note 171, at 32 (“[T]here may be particular questions raised at those points 
where policy divergence appears also to impinge on the ‘rights’ of the affected populations. It might be 
supposed that some such ‘rights’ should not be subject to the vagaries of devolution but should be 
enjoyed uniformly by all citizens across the state as a whole.”); id. at 48 (“[D]evolution has probably 
produced conditions in which . . . irrational or unexplained diversity of practice, especially if this affects 
the ‘rights’ of citizens, will prove to be less readily tolerated.”); id. at 58 (“[T]he asymmetries of access 
to ‘rights’ even though of quite long standing, may become more exposed to scrutiny. There may 
become a greater intolerance of ‘postcode law.’”). 
305 Id. at 54. 
306 Id. at 55 (emphasis omitted). 
307 It is the individual who claims her rights to have been violated that brings the petition to the 
ECtHR. This connection between an individual and the ECtHR moves the Convention system away 
from classic international treaties or international law. As the ECtHR itself declared in 1978, “the 
Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, 
over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of 
the Preamble, benefit from a ‘collective enforcement.’” Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 90, para. 239 (1978). 
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and it is the United Kingdom that ratified and is party to the treaty.308 
Rights-based challenges to actions by Scottish entities result in petitions 
filed against the United Kingdom in Strasbourg. It is, therefore, in the 
interest of the British government and the Westminster Parliament to find 
an effective mechanism of ensuring uniformity at the national level, in 
advance of challenges at the ECtHR. The imposition of international 
obligations counsels in favor of having a domestic institution with the 
power to ensure subnational compliance.309 
In light of these interests, what are the possibilities for divergent 
application or definition of rights, and which institution can best solve for 
the variation? In the evolution of judicial authority in the United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court gained power during times in which it was the only 
national institution available to impose uniform rules.310 Litigants petitioned 
the Court and attempted to strengthen its role and power in the 
constitutional system in order to benefit from its nationalizing tendencies.311 
Is there an analogous opportunity for the U.K. Supreme Court? 
In the United States, the American Supreme Court was able to provide 
nationalizing, uniform rulings when Congress was either unable or 
unwilling to use its legislative power to impose uniformity on the states.312 
But in the United Kingdom, Westminster maintains its authority to enact 
legislation for Scotland. Furthermore, although the U.K. Supreme Court 
may be able to declare certain acts of the Scottish Parliament ultra vires if 
in violation of the HRA, it can only find similar legislation passed by 
Westminster “incompatible.”313 Thus, divergent legislation on rights issues 
can be remedied only by Westminster itself. 
There is, however, one area in which the Westminster Parliament is 
less able to enforce uniformity across the United Kingdom: criminal law. 
As a condition of the 1707 Act of Union, Scots law, and in particular, Scots 
criminal law, was to remain separate from English law.314 Westminster can 
change Scots criminal law, and it has done so, most recently in the 
 
308 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
309 This dynamic is also presented by the application of European Union law within Britain, and the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords has been alert to its role in promoting uniformity. See 
Himsworth, supra note 171, at 49 (footnote omitted) (“The goal of uniformity in the application of EC 
law does, of course, have specific consequences for the UK jurisdictions—a point recently noted in the 
Abna applications brought in all three jurisdictions to suspend Regulations pending the outcome of 
proceedings before the ECJ. In Abna Ltd v. Scottish Ministers, the view was expressed that it would be 
‘extremely unsatisfactory if different situations existed in different parts of the United Kingdom.’”). 
310 See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 12, at 1154–59, 1172–76. 
311 See id. at 1160–62 (discussing the role of national commercial interests in support of the U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
312 See id. at 1168–72 (discussing the commerce power in the late 1800s). 
313 See supra Part II.A. 
314 See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1613, 1655 & n.238 (2011). 
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Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,315 but it “has historically been 
extremely reluctant to interfere.”316 In addition, and to protect the integrity 
of Scottish criminal law, the 1707 Act of Union did not give the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords jurisdiction to hear appeals from the 
High Court of Justiciary, the highest criminal court in Scotland.317 
Unsurprisingly, over time, the law of England and Wales has developed 
differently from that of Scotland in many areas, including the regulation of 
“police powers of arrest and detention.”318 
During the promulgation of the Scotland Act in 1998, the potential 
tension over Scots criminal law was not obvious. As noted above, 
“devolution issues” were expected to be challenges to the actions of the 
Scottish Parliament as outside the statutory division of competences 
provided in the Scotland Act. Yet almost immediately, creative litigants 
began collateral attacks on Scots criminal law by arguing that various 
actions of the Lord Advocate (Scotland’s attorney general) were in 
violation of Convention rights and therefore ultra vires. In 1999, the Privy 
Council was faced with an unanticipated and “extraordinarily” high number 
of these actions challenging prosecutorial decisions or collaterally attacking 
judicial decisions.319 The Privy Council, however, was considered to be an 
acceptable entity to hear these challenges, as it had a longstanding role in 
monitoring the relationship between the United Kingdom and its 
Commonwealth countries.320 Its potential for creating uniform law on 
rights-related issues, however, was limited; the House of Lords remained 
the highest court for HRA questions presented by England and Wales. 
During negotiations over the jurisdiction of the new Supreme Court, 
Scottish judges and politicians sought and received assurances that the 
historical isolation of Scots criminal law would be maintained.321 
Surprisingly, however, there was little focus on the decision to transfer the 
jurisdiction over devolution issues from the Privy Council to the Supreme 
Court. But the ability of the Supreme Court to hear these claims changed 
the nature of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Scots 
criminal law.322 Two major cases demonstrated the new power of the 
 
315 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46. 
316 Hazel Lewry, The Conundrum of Scots Law, NEWSNETSCOTLAND (July 8, 2011, 11:16 PM), 
http://www.newsnetscotland.com/index.php/scottish-opinion/2639-the%20conundrum-of-scots-
law.htm. 
317 The prohibition on criminal appeals was confirmed in Bywater v. Crown, (1781) 2 Paton 563 
(H.L.); see also Stuart Reid & Janice Edwards, The Scottish Legal System, 9 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 9, 12 
(2009) (discussing Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 15). 
318 Himsworth, supra note 171, at 36. 
319 Id. at 56 & n.107. 
320 See supra Part II.B. 
321 See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
322 Aidan O’Neill, The End of the Independent Scottish Criminal Legal System? The Constitutional 
Significance of Allison and McInnes, UKSC BLOG (Feb. 15, 2010), http://ukscblog.com/the-end-of-the-
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Supreme Court to insert itself into the previously separate Scottish domain 
in an effort to provide unifying rights interpretation. 
In 2009, the High Court of Justiciary decided HM Advocate v. 
McLean,323 in which the defendant argued his interrogation without legal 
counsel violated Article 6 of the European Convention. In support of his 
claim, McLean relied on the ECtHR’s 2008 decision in Salduz v. Turkey, 
finding “irretrievabl[e] prejudice[] when incriminating statements made 
during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a 
conviction.”324 But the Scottish court, based on considerable precedent, 
concluded that there was no such violation, because “[i]n its opinion the 
guarantees otherwise available under the Scottish system were sufficient to 
avoid the risk of any unfairness.”325 McLean also argued that the Scottish 
prosecutor’s reliance on admissions made without access to legal advice 
raised a devolution issue, as the Scotland Act (1998) provided that acts in 
violation of the Convention could be found ultra vires. The High Court of 
Justiciary did not address devolution and denied leave to present the 
devolution issue before the Supreme Court; nevertheless the Supreme 
Court granted permission to appeal.326 
Unlike its approach in Horncastle, the Supreme Court did not attempt 
to justify the Scottish system in light of Scottish history and interests.327 
Lord Hope rejected the idea that the  
question whether or not a detainee who was interrogated without access to a 
lawyer has had a fair trial will depend on the arrangements the particular 
jurisdiction has made, including any guarantees otherwise in place there. 
Distinctions of that kind would be entirely out of keeping with the Strasbourg 
court’s approach to problems posed by the Convention, which is to provide 
 
independent-scottish-criminal-legal-system-the-constitutional-significance-of-allison-and-mcinnes 
(“How has the independence, the splendid isolation/crabbed insularity (depending on one’s perspective) 
of the Scottish criminal justice system been brought to an end, some three hundred years into the Union 
in which there had simply been no possibility of any criminal appeals from Scotland to London?”). 
323 [2009] HCJAC 97. 
324 Salduz v. Turkey, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 59, paras. 55–56; see also Cadder v. HM Advocate, 
[2010] UKSC 43, [2010] 1 WLR 2601 [3] (describing holding in Salduz as finding a violation of Article 
6 “because the applicant did not have the benefit of legal assistance while he was in police custody”). 
325 Cadder, [2010] UKSC at [3]. 
326 Id. at [11]–[12]. 
327 There was space in the doctrine to make such an argument. See Mads Andenas & Eirik Bjorge, 
The External Effects of National ECHR Judgments 27 (The Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 
07/12, 2012), available at www.JeanMonnetProgram.org (“On balance, therefore, it would have been 
conceivable—as conceivable as it was in Horncastle—to say in Cadder that the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence fell somewhat short of being ‘clear and constant,’ and at all events that the Court had—as 
it had in Horncastle—‘concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently 
appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process.’” (quoting R v. Horncastle, 
[2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 A.C. 373 [11])). 
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principled solutions that are universally applicable in all the contracting 
states.328 
There was not to be “one rule for the countries in Eastern Europe such as 
Turkey on the one hand and those on its western fringes such as Scotland 
on the other.”329 In light of Horncastle, this analysis seems unusual. Lord 
Hope rested his analysis on the (presumed) clarity of the European 
jurisprudence and the (arguable) necessity of European-wide uniformity,330 
but, and perhaps critically, he noted that Scotland was an outlier within the 
United Kingdom on this issue. Access to legal advice is provided in the law 
in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.331 
The response of the media was overwhelmingly positive, noting the 
benefits to Scottish defendants332 and the new uniformity with protections 
under English law.333 In addition, the Scottish Executive clearly anticipated 
the result, as the day following the judgment, the Scottish Parliament 
passed emergency legislation to address the issue, in the form of the 
Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) 
Act, 2010.334 At the same time, Lord Carloway, a senior Scottish judge, was 
asked to conduct a thorough review of Scots law and practice. His report 
was published over a year later, on November 17, 2011, and recommended 
making substantive changes to criminal procedure while maintaining a 
“distinctly Scottish criminal justice system for the future.”335 
 
328 Cadder, [2010] UKSC at [40]. 
329 Id. 
330 See Andenas & Bjorge, supra note 327, at 27. 
331 Cadder, [2010] UKSC at [49] (“[Scotland] would not be able to find support for [its] position 
from England and Wales or Northern Ireland. Access to legal advice was described in R v Samuel 
[1988] QB 615 as a fundamental right, and section 58(I) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
provides that a person arrested and held in custody in a police station or other premises shall be entitled, 
if he so requires, to consult a solicitor privately at any time: see also section 59(I) of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (SI 1989/1341).”). 
332 See Carl Gardner, UK Supreme Court Judgment: Cadder v H.M. Advocate, HEAD OF LEGAL 
BLOG (Oct. 26, 2010), http://headoflegal.com/2010/10/26/cadder-v-h-m-advocate (describing the 
Cadder case as “one of the shining examples of the benefits of the Human Rights Act”); see also 
Severin Carrell, Alex Salmond Provokes Fury with Attack on UK Supreme Court, GUARDIAN (June 1, 
2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/01/alex-salmond-scotland-supreme-court 
(noting that “[n]early 3,500 convictions were affected”). 
333 Joshua Rozenberg, Supreme Court: Where There Is Discord, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2012, 7:43 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/25/supreme-court-phillips-neuberger (complimenting the 
Court on spurring the creation of “safeguards that had been available in England for more than 25 
years”). 
334 (A.S.P. 15). 
335 Press Release, Scottish Gov’t, Creating a Fair Justice System for the 21st Century (Nov. 17, 
2011), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Review/CarlowayReview/Newsrelease; see 
SCOTTISH GOV’T, REFORMING SCOTS CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE: THE CARLOWAY REPORT (2012), 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0039/00396483.pdf. For a substantive discussion of the 
recommendations of the Carloway Report, see James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, ‘Substantial and 
Radical Change’: A New Dawn for Scottish Criminal Procedure?, 75 M.L.R. 837 (2012). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 
600
Notwithstanding the evidence suggesting Scotland was aware of and 
prepared to remedy its outlier status, Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny 
MacAskill and Lord Advocate Elish Angiolini chafed at the Supreme 
Court’s directives. MacAskill grudgingly accepted the result: 
The decision overturns decades of criminal procedure in Scotland, a proud, 
distinctive, justice system, developed over centuries, and predicated on 
fairness with many rigorous protections for accused persons. . . . Today’s 
judgment in the Supreme Court has gone against the unanimous decision last 
October by seven Scottish High Court judges at the Scottish Appeal 
Court . . . . We are concerned that the current devolution arrangements have 
created an anomaly that seems to put Scottish law at a disadvantage in 
comparison to elsewhere in the EU. I want to see steps taken to address this 
anomaly.336 
Angiolini shared MacAskill’s concerns, worrying that “because of the 
approach of the Supreme Court,” the future held not only harmonization 
but “a complete loss of identity for Scots law.”337 
The aftermath of Cadder was a positive development for criminal 
defendants in Scotland, and the Supreme Court was seen as an outlet for 
rights protection: attacks on the Scottish criminal justice system only 
increased in the few years after the Supreme Court was incorporated, 
reinforcing litigation, rather than legislation, as the possible solution to 
divergent rules.338 In 2011, the Court heard another high-profile case from 
Scotland that again raised questions about Scottish criminal justice. 
Before the High Court of Justiciary, Nat Fraser appealed his 
conviction for the murder of his wife on the ground that the prosecution 
had failed to disclose evidence favorable to his case. He also raised a 
devolution issue, arguing that the prosecution’s failure violated his rights 
under Article 6 of the Convention.339 The Scottish court refused his appeal 
and denied his application to appeal to the Supreme Court, concluding that 
the Westminster Parliament had not intended a right to appeal on criminal 
matters when it enacted the Scotland Act (1998).340 
The Supreme Court granted Fraser’s application for special leave to 
appeal. Lord Hope concluded that the Appeal Court had failed properly to 
entertain the argument that Fraser’s Article 6 Convention rights were 
 
336 Justice Secretary Responds to the Supreme Court Decision, STV NEWS (Oct. 26, 2010, 11:08 
AM), http://news.stv.tv/politics/204963-justice-secretary-responds-to-the-supreme-court-decision. 
337 Lord Advocate Elish Angiolini on Legal Identity ‘Loss,’ BBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2011, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-12399287. 
338 Cf. DAVID C. NICE, FEDERALISM: THE POLITICS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 23 
(1987) (“[C]ontestants in intergovernmental politics seek the scope of conflict and decision-making 
arena most likely to produce the desired policy decision.”). 
339 Fraser v. HM Advocate (Scotland), [2011] UKSC 24, [1]–[3], [10]. 
340 See Fraser v. HM Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 27. 
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violated.341 The Supreme Court held that there was miscarriage of justice at 
Fraser’s trial and that the appeal must be allowed. The Court itself did not 
quash the conviction, but remanded to a differently constituted Scottish 
appeal court to determine the possibility of retrial and, after having 
considered that question, to quash the conviction.342 
The political response to the decision was deafening.343 Scotland’s 
First Minister, Alex Salmond, lambasted the Supreme Court as treading on 
the independence of the Scottish legal system, referring to the Court as a 
“foreign” court.344 Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill threatened to 
withhold the Scottish contribution to the Court’s operating fund.345 And 
Lord Hope felt the need to respond by giving an interview to The Times 
defending the decision.346 After the initial heated exchanges, a compromise 
position was achieved: Salmond appointed a committee learned in Scots 
law to review the issue.347 
This “Review Group” issued its final report in September 2011, and 
the results reaffirmed the importance of the Supreme Court in this area. The 
Group concluded that there was “some justification for allowing an appeal 
to the Supreme Court on the new matter of compliance with the 
Convention rights specified in the Human Rights Act 1998,” a justification 
driven in large part by the need “to ensure that Convention rights are 
defined and understood by courts in the same way throughout the United 
Kingdom.”348 It further accepted 
that the nature of the British constitution, and the separate position of Scots 
law in general (and Scots criminal law in particular) means that some 
asymmetries are unavoidable. . . . It is important to reduce these 
asymmetries . . . when they are unintended or lack any justification in terms of 
historical distinctiveness or current rationale.349 
 
341 Fraser, [2011] UKSC at [12], [14]. 
342 Id. at [43]. 
343 Carrell, supra note 332 (“The row has split the Scottish judiciary and legal profession. Many 
senior judges, supported by the former lord advocate Elish Angiolini, have openly challenged the 
supreme court’s authority to overrule them.”). 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 Magnus Linklater & Lindsay McIntosh, Salmond Has Got It All Wrong, Says Judge, THE TIMES 
(London) (May 27, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/scotland/article30414
68.ece. 
347 Salmond appointed Lord McCluskey, Sir Gerald Gordon, Sheriff Charles Stoddart, and 
Professor Neil Walker. Press Release, Scottish Gov’t, UK Supreme Court (May 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2011/06/04200343. 
348 LORD MCCLUSKEY, SIR GERALD GORDON, SHERIFF CHARLES STODDART & PROFESSOR NEIL 
WALKER, FINAL REPORT OF REVIEW GROUP: EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY AND THE SUPREME COURT IN CRIMINAL CASES para. 10 (2011). 
349 Id. para. 40. 
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The Group did seek to equalize the process by which appeals were sought 
by replicating the procedures in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, all 
of which require the lower court to certify that the case raises a point of law 
of general public importance.350 Criminal cases would no longer be truly 
insulated from centralized review. 
Notwithstanding the report from the experts and the general 
willingness of much of the legal profession to accept the Court’s 
determinations, the aftermath of the Fraser case demonstrated the limits of 
the Supreme Court’s abilities. Scottish nationalists remained agitated by the 
intrusion into Scots law.351 Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond began to 
work directly with Prime Minister Cameron to arrange a nonbinding 
referendum on Scottish independence and further sought to influence the 
proposed 2012 amendments to the original Scotland Act of 1998, 
restructuring some of the devolutionary settlement.352 The existence of 
political channels to allow for the negotiation of asymmetrical aspects of 
the relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom provides a 
means to work around the Court. Fraser’s aftermath also suggests that 
Scottish independence isn’t the type of crosscutting issue that will lead to 
parliamentary delegation to the Court. Thus far, the parties (the 
governments in Westminster and Holyrood, as well as Conservative, 
Labour, Liberal, and Scottish Democratic political parties) have sought to 
reach negotiated settlements, rather than leave the contentious issues to 
litigation. 
Nonetheless, even in light of pressure from Scotland, if the Court 
maintains an institutional advantage in harmonizing rights across the 
various subnational entities that make up the U.K., the Westminster 
Parliament could be expected to protect the Court and its unique unifying 
role, and even to enhance the Court’s power.353 The results in the Scotland 
Act (2012) provide marginal support for this theory. The proposed Scotland 
Bill was drafted in response to a report by the Calman Committee354—a 
group convened by motion in the Scottish Parliament in 2007 with a remit 
to review the provisions of the 1998 Act “in the light of experience” and to 
 
350 Id. at 1 (Executive Summary). 
351 Severin Carrell, UK Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction in Scotland Upheld by Review Panel, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2011, 2:48 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/sep/14/supreme-court-
scotland-jurisdiction-upheld (citing MacAskill as saying that “[s]ome of the finest legal and 
constitutional minds in the country have recognised that the UK supreme court plays a much more 
significant—and inappropriate—role in Scottish criminal law than had been envisaged when the 
Scotland Act was passed, and that it is more intrusive within Scots law than is the case for the other 
jurisdictions within the UK”). 
352 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
353 Cf. Friedman & Delaney, supra note 12, at 1149–59 (describing the manner in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court achieved vertical supremacy in the United States). 
354 See Commission Members, COMMISSION ON SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION, http://www.commission
onscottishdevolution.org.uk/about/members.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
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recommend changes.355 The Calman Committee’s Final Report made a 
number of recommendations, including, perhaps most importantly, 
expanding Scotland’s taxing and borrowing powers.356 The Report was 
issued in June 2009, before the Supreme Court opened for business in 
October of that year. It did not address the tensions over criminal 
appeals.357 
As initially proposed in the Westminster Parliament, the Scotland Act 
(2012) did not alter the provisions in the 1998 Act that referred to criminal 
law or the actions of Scotland’s top prosecutor.358 But, due to the Sewel 
Convention, which provides the Scottish Parliament opportunity to discuss 
and consent to Westminster’s proposed alterations to Scottish powers,359 the 
Bill spent a considerable amount of time in committee at Holyrood after its 
introduction. The Scotland Bill Committee of the Scottish Parliament 
raised the issue of “Convention rights, the Scotland Act, and Scots criminal 
law,”360 and through an informal consultation procedure initiated by the 
Advocate General,361 pressure was brought to bear on the U.K. government 
to introduce an amendment to limit the Supreme Court’s ability to hear and 
remedy criminal cases arising from Scotland.362 
The Fraser case was handed down as the Bill went to its third reading 
in the House of Commons.363 In Westminster, parliamentarians were torn. 
 
355 See Frequently Asked Questions, COMMISSION ON SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION, 
http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/about/faqs.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
356 COMM’N ON SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION, SERVING SCOTLAND BETTER: SCOTLAND AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM IN THE 21ST CENTURY para. 3.206 (2009). 
357 Id. para. 5.37 (2009) (“The Commission acknowledges the importance of this issue, and 
considers . . . that it is an issue that deserves urgent reconsideration. It has, however, come to the 
conclusion that it raises wider questions that do not come within its remit. The underlying question is 
whether, and if so to what extent, Scottish criminal law and procedure should in future be subject to 
review by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.”). 
358 See 519 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2010) 689 (U.K.). 
359 See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
360 Material Provided by the Scottish Government to the Scotland Bill Committee, SCOTTISH 
GOV’T, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/03/Briefing-Scotland-bill (last visited Mar. 23, 
2014); see also SCOTLAND BILL COMM., REPORT ON THE SCOTLAND BILL AND RELEVANT 
LEGISLATIVE CONSENT MEMORANDA paras. 916–73 (2011), available at http://archive.scottish.
parliament.uk/s3/committees/scotBill/reports-11/sbr11-01-1.htm#79. 
361 The Advocate General, a member of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, advises the U.K. government 
on Scots law. Ministerial Role: HM Advocate General for Scotland, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/
government/ministers/hm-advocate-general-for-scotland (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). The position was 
created in the Scotland Act (1998) as part of the restructuring of the Scottish Office due to devolution. 
See Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, para. 87. 
362 For a discussion of the proposed amendments and the Scottish response, see Aidan O’Neill, The 
Englishing of Scots Criminal Law?—The Advocate-General’s Proposals for the Appeals to the Supreme 
Court in Criminal Cases from Scotland, UKSC BLOG (Mar. 17, 2011), http://ukscblog.com/devolution-
issues-and-acts-of-the-lord-advocate-consultation-on-clauses-to-amend-the-scotland-act. 
363 Fraser v. HM Advocate (Scotland), [2011] UKSC 24; Bill Stages—Scotland Act 2012, U.K. 
PARLIAMENT, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-12/scotland/stages.html (last visited Mar. 23, 
2014). 
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Ann McKechin, a Labor Member of Parliament, described the Supreme 
Court in glowing terms. She noted, “[N]o one living in Scotland should 
have less access to the enforcement of their human rights than any other 
citizen living elsewhere in the UK.”364 She also expressed frustration at 
statements from Salmond and MacAskill, who had argued that the U.K. 
Supreme Court should have no jurisdiction in Scottish criminal cases.365 
Ultimately, an amendment passed and was incorporated into the Scotland 
Bill (2012), limiting the power of the Court to review certain acts of the 
Lord Advocate as ultra vires for devolution purposes.366 However, stronger 
limits on the Court were not introduced; it retains the jurisdiction to hear 
devolution—now called “compatibility”—issues raised in the context of a 
criminal case.367 It is, however, limited in its ability to create remedies and 
must return the case to the High Court of Justiciary for final disposition.368 
The relationships among the Supreme Court, the Human Rights Act, 
and Scotland are far from settled. The new compatibility provisions came 
into force in April 2013,369 and it may be some time before the next Fraser 
makes its way to the Supreme Court.370 Some lawyers and politicians 
appear to believe that the Court plays an important role in unifying the 
rights regime across the United Kingdom and in keeping outlier Scotland in 
line. Even under pressure from Scottish interests and in the face of a 
threatened referendum on independence, the Westminster Parliament 
maintained some role for the Court, perhaps acknowledging the Court’s 
unique role in maintaining equal rights for all British citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
Building on the theoretical insights from literature on judicial 
empowerment and federalism, this Article has identified elements within 
 
364 530 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2011) 286 (U.K.). The Bill as introduced in 2010 is available at 
Bill Documents—Scotland Act 2012, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-12/
scotland/documents.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
365 530 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2011) 286–87 (U.K.). 
366 Sections 34, 35, and 36 of the enacted Scotland Act (2012) were not in the original Act as 
proposed in the House of Commons. See Scotland Bill, 2010–11, H.C. Bill [115], available at 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-12/scotland/documents.html. 
367 Scotland Act, 2012, c. 11, §§ 34, 35, 36; SUPREME COURT OF THE U.K., THE JURISDICTION OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN SCOTTISH APPEALS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
SCOTLAND ACT 2012 (2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/role-of-the-supreme-
court.html. 
368 Scotland Act, 2012, c. 11, §§ 35, 36; SUPREME COURT OF THE U.K., THE JURISDICTION, supra 
note 367. 
369 See Scotland Act, 2012, c. 11, § 44 (effective date of the Act); The Scotland Act 2012 
(Commencement No. 3) Order 2013, 2013, S.I. 2013/6 (U.K.). 
370 As of December 2013, the Court has yet to rule on an issue brought to it under the new 
procedures. See Decided Cases, SUP. CT., http://supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/index.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014) (listing no case between April 22, 2013, and December 18, 2013, addressing Scots 
criminal law or application of such law in the context of a compatibility issue). 
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the British system that may, in time, serve to support the increased power 
of the British judiciary and the U.K. Supreme Court in particular. The 
connection between multilevel governance structures and rights protection 
demonstrates repeated opportunities for the Court to accrue power, based 
on the interests of parliamentarians and politicians at both the central and 
subnational levels of the country. The Court is uniquely placed to monitor 
crucial boundaries at the subnational and international levels as well as to 
provide uniformity across the national level, particularly regarding rights 
protection. 
The U.K. Supreme Court is poised to become more powerful. Whether 
a rising judiciary will truly undermine parliamentary sovereignty remains 
to be seen, but scholars and politicians should pay attention to the 
groundwork being laid. The relationships and evolving dynamics outlined 
here serve as some support for those who suggest that constitutional reform 
is moving the U.K. in a legal constitutionalist direction. Of course, the 
institutional growth of courts is not a perfect proxy for external limitations 
on parliament. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, parliamentary 
sovereignty retains a powerful conceptual hold on judges, politicians, and 
academics. Thus, some will continue to rationalize, harmonize, and 
reconcile a rising judiciary with some version of parliamentary sovereignty, 
though these efforts may be possible only through formalism or, ultimately, 
fiat. 
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